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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the 2016 election, the shortcomings of existing
sanctuary protections came sharply into focus.1 Historically, cities
enacted sanctuary protections to extricate their law enforcement
agencies from activities related to federal immigration enforcement.
In sanctuary cities, local government agencies are typically restricted
from sharing information with federal immigration authorities or
from cooperating in apprehending individuals targeted for removal.2
After the White House issued an Executive Order (EO) in late
January 2017, many immigrant rights advocates recognized that
external facing policies that proscribed direct cooperation would not
suffice.3  The EO announced that Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) would prioritize removing any undocumented
person charged or convicted of a crime, no matter how serious.4
Recognizing the vital role state criminal courts play and would
continue to play in fueling deportations, public defenders in New
York City ("City") identified a new actor with the power to enact
stronger protections: the prosecutor.
5
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1 See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding "Sanctuary Cities", 59 B.C. L. REV.
1703, 1705, 1708-09, 1751-52 (2018).
2 See, e.g., id.
3 See Lasch et al., supra note 1, at 1713-14, 1718.
4 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 25, 2017).
6 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium on Broken Windows Prosecutions, MEDIUM (Jan.
30, 2017), https://medium.com/@5BoroDefenders/call-for-a-moratorium-on-broken-windows-




Prosecutors are the most powerful actors in the American criminal
legal system.6 Their imperial discretion shapes how the law gets
applied, who gets punished, and who is forgiven.7 It has always been
true that a prosecutor's charging, bail, and plea bargaining practices
regularly expose noncitizens to the risk of removal.8 Skillful defense
negotiations can sometimes mitigate those consequences.9 But, after
January 25, 2017, the mere accusation of a crime, no matter how
serious, created a heightened risk of removal for undocumented
individuals.10 Under this new enforcement regime, prosecutors
became a more obvious focus for reform, as the actors responsible for
leveling criminal charges." They remain an underappreciated
source for sanctuary protections, however.'
2
This Article examines the role local prosecutors can play to isolate
cities and states from the federal immigration enforcement regime,
by describing a campaign launched days after the January 25, 2017
EO's promulgation. The #NYCdontprosecute campaign demanded
that local district attorneys (DAs) suspend prosecutions for broken
windows offenses because of the heightened risk of removal prompted
by a criminal charge.13  Public defenders, who recognized the
inadequacy of their standard tactics to mitigate the collateral
consequences of contacts between law enforcement and noncitizens
launched the campaign.14 They asked the public to exert pressure on
their adversaries in order to win greater protections for their
clients.
15
Since the White House announced new immigration priorities in
2017, immigrant rights and criminal justice reform advocates have
called for cities to broaden protections for their most vulnerable
6 See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1522 (1981).
7 See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty,
and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390-91 (2008).
8 See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1754 (2013); 5 Boro Defs., FAQ, MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2017), https://medium
.com/@5BoroDefenders/faq-d8159da6af76 [https://perma.cc/5DQA-ZDLJ] [hereinafter 5 Boro
Defs., FAQ].
9 See Cade, supra note 8, at 1754.
10 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 25, 2017); 5 Boro Defs., Call
for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
11 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5; 5 Boro Defenders, Medium, https://
medium.com/@5BoroDefenders [https://perma.cc/4EHW-TN7K].
15 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
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residents.16  Platforms, such as the Expanded Sanctuary and
Freedom City, try to expand the scope of sanctuary protections.17
Decriminalization of low-level offenses feature prominently in their
vision.18 The #NYCdontprosecute campaign was an early example of
this broader vision for sanctuary protections, which targeted the
discretion of district attorneys, as the site for de facto
decriminalization.19 The campaign offers a case study to explore the
advantages of asking prosecutors to nullify low-level offenses to
create these broader protections.
I examine the substantive elements and strategic merits of the
campaign under two different frameworks for criminal law reform: a
liberal and an abolitionist. I do so to draw out the differences in these
approaches to legal change, and to stay true to the spirit animating
the campaign that borrowed elements of both.20
Nullification is the decision by a prosecutor not to charge an offense
or category of offenses because she disagrees with "the wisdom of the
law or [with] the desirability of punishing a culpable wrongdoer."21
From the perspective of a liberal law reform agenda, when a
prosecutor nullifies low-level offenses, it can be argued that it
corrects for criminal law's apparent deviation from its core purpose
of adjudicating real crimes.22 Broken windows offenses criminalize
poor communities of color and lack any semblance of normative guilt.
Prosecutions for such charges are often resolved without a legal
finding of guilt. Each of these characteristics poses a challenge to the
myths that the criminal legal system tells about itself: that it is fair,
color blind, and holds individuals accountable for their bad acts. 'We
16 See John Carlos Frey, How 'Sanctuary Cities' are Helping Immigrants Outwit ICE,
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 20, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/06/19/how-
sanctuary-cities-are-helping-immigrants-outwit-ice [https://perma.cc/8M4Z-Q84K].
17 See ANDREA J. RITCHIE & MONIQUE W. MORRIS, NAT'L BLACK WOMEN'S JUSTICE INST.,
CENTERING BLACK WOMEN, GIRLS, GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE AND FEM(ME)S IN
CAMPAIGNS FOR EXPANDED SANCTUARY AND FREEDOM CITIES 3 (2017), https://forwomen.org
/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Centering-Black-women-final-draft6.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W62-
CWA6]; TANIA A. UNZUETA, MIJENTE, EXPANDING SANCTUARY: WHAT MAKES A CITY A
SANCTUARY Now? 1 (2017); The Platform, FREEDOM CITIES, https://freedomcities.org/platform/
[https://perma.cc/2BDB-7D9S].
18 See RITCHIE & MORRIS, supra note 17, at 3; UNZUETA, supra note 17, at 2.
19 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
20 See Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 409-
10 (2018) (contrasting the 2016 policy platform of the Movement for Black Lives with the
Department of Justice reports on Ferguson and Baltimore to draw out the differences between
"traditional liberal approaches to criminal law reform" with a "decarceral agenda rooted in an
abolitionist imagination").
21 Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1262 (2011).
22 See Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 4,
80-81 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017); Fairfax, supra note 21, at 1274.
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can think of nullification as a corrective measure that cleans house.
Nullification similarly advances a liberal immigration agenda that
seeks to expel "[fjelons, not families."23 Furthermore, the aggressive
enforcement of broken windows offenses in New York City has been
a distinctly local and urban phenomenon.24 When a local prosecutor
declines to prosecute, her decision arguably realigns the criminal and
immigration systems with their intended purpose, but in a way that
is geographically and institutionally contained. Nullification
embraces the traditional liberal view of the prosecutor as the actor
best placed to make decisions about local criminal enforcement.
But abolitionist principles also animated the campaign. The
movement for prison abolition works to decrease the power and reach
of carceral institutions, from the prison to the immigration detention
center.25 "Abolitionists refuse to abide the paradigm where 'prisons
[serve] as catchall solutions to social problems."'26  Practically
speaking, activists in this tradition fight against prison and jail
expansions, increases in police budgets and sentences, and advocate
in favor of decriminalization and clemency.27 As resources are
divested away from law enforcement, an abolitionist agenda
advocates for resources to be reinvested into services and institutions
that address the root causes of harm and violence.28 For our
23 See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20,
2014) [hereinafter 2014 Obama Immigration National Address], https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-
immigration [https://perma.cc/CV8V-X5BC].
Even as we are a nation of immigrants, we're also a nation of laws. Undocumented
workers broke our immigration laws, and I believe that they must be held accountable-
especially those who may be dangerous. That's why, over the past six years, deportations
of criminals are up 80 percent. And that's why we're going to keep focusing enforcement
resources on actual threats to our security. Felons, not families. Criminals, not children.
Gang members, not a mom who's working hard to provide for her kids. We'll prioritize,
just like law enforcement does every day.
Id.
24 See LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND
CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (2011); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1314, 1316 (2012); Shankar Vedantam et al., How a Theory of Crime and Policing
Was Born, and Went Terribly Wrong, NPR (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/01
/500104506/broken-windows-policing-and-the-origins-of-stop-and-frisk-and-how-itwent-
wrong [https://perma.cc/DPR7-2QKR].





- See Liz Samuels & David Stein, Perspectives on Critical Resistance, in ABOLITION Now!
TEN YEARS OF STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 1, 1-14 (2008) ("Abolition
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purposes, an abolitionist praxis begins by scrutinizing and
dismantling the legal processes that generate categories like alien
and criminal, which serve to advance an agenda of racial, ethnic, and
class exclusion.29 The campaign's aim of shrinking the ambit of
criminalization helps to prevent undocumented persons from being
detected and noncitizens acquiring grounds for their removal. It
proposed a policy that goes further than conventional sanctuary
protections.30 Nullification alone, however, is not an end state for
abolition, but a stop along the way. Nullification without legislative
change or a reduction in prosecutors' budgets threatens to enhance
rather than diminish prosecutorial power because nullification is the
maximal expression of prosecutorial discretion. Most significantly,
and in contrast to a liberal law reform approach, an abolitionist ethic
emphasizes the importance not of portraying broken windows
offenses as an aberration of an otherwise healthy system, but an
expression of its core features. Subscription to the abolitionist ethic
requires pointing to the continuities between the treatment of low-
level offenses and serious crimes by the crimmigration system.
As a matter of process, the campaign models a way to expand the
otherwise narrow opportunities for prosecutorial accountability.
Asking members of the public to call the DA's office created a new
form of engagement with prosecutorial policy that is unmediated,
direct, and underappreciated.31 While a public call for prosecutors to
nullify can appear anti-democratic, the campaign built on the gains
of over a decade of sustained organizing that questioned the
empirical and normative claims advanced by the theory of broken
windows policing. This grassroots effort ushered in a new consensus
that has helped to redefine public safety.32 Although the campaign
defines both the end goal we seek and the way we do our work today. Abolition means a world
where we do not use prisons, policing, and the larger system of the prison industrial complex
as an 'answer' to what are social, political, and economic problems. Abolition is not just an end
goal but a strategy today."); Chris Hayes & Mariame Kaba, Thinking About How to Abolish
Prisons with Mariame Kaba, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019, 12:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/think/opinionlthinking-about-how-abolish-prisons-mariame-kaba-podcast-transcript-
ncna992721 [https://perma.cc/GH3M-RVBG].
29 See Dylan Rodriguez, Abolition as a Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 1575, 1575, 1586 (2019) ("By any historical measure, the institutional formation of
incarceration within the purviews of U.S. criminal justice statecraft has produced a social logic,
jurisprudence, cultural structure, and militarized policing apparatus that naturalize the
condition of state captivity for criminalized people, populations, and geographies.").
30 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
31 See, e.g., 5 Boro Defenders (@5borodefenders), FACEBOOK (June 3, 2017), https://
www.facebook.com/5borodefenders/ [https://perma.cc/87QW-HWZW] [hereinafter 5 Boro
Defenders, FACEBOOK (June 3, 2017)].
32 See Joo-Hyun Kang, Fighting Broken Windows Policing in New York City in the '90s and
2019/2020]
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was disruptive, it built on the achievements of longstanding social
movements actively reshaping the City's law enforcement agencies.
33
The campaign was ultimately a modest one: it lasted only three
months. A few months after the campaign ended, two DAs promised
to stop prosecuting some categories of cases, without revealing their
motivations.3 4 Yet, despite its limited success, the campaign spurred
other initiatives that have since gained wider traction locally and
nationally.35 As cities contemplate decriminalization as a sanctuary
strategy, this article hopes to offer advocates guidance for the road
ahead.
The motivations for writing this piece are also personal: I was one
of the public defenders who helped to organize the campaign. We
launched the campaign without the benefit of planning, and in a
climate of fear on behalf of our clients. This Article offers an
opportunity to critically assess the policy proposed and the tactics
deployed. The Article begins by narrating the organizers' rationale
for the campaign, and then attempts to test its assumptions and
predictions, by engaging with scholarship on crimmigration,
prosecutorial discretion, and abolition.
I. CITY SANCTUARY PROTECTIONS
As the federal government has come to rely more and more on
municipalities, counties, and states to enforce immigration law, New
York City tried to resist this trend. The City enacted sanctuary
protections that have been progressively strengthened over the
years.36 Indeed, the results of the 2016 election sparked new interest




See Press Release, Manhattan Dist. Attorney's Office, District Attorney Vance to End
Criminal Prosecution of Approximately 20,000 Low-Level, Non-Violent Misdemeanors per Year
(June 30, 2017), https://www.manhattanda.org/district-attorney-vance-end-criminal-
prosecution-approximately-20000-low-level-non-vio/ [https://perma.ccIW2XU-V7KC]; Caroline
Bankoff, Brooklyn D.A. Will Try to Prevent Immigrants from Being Deported for Minor Crimes,
N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 24, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/04[brooklyn-d-a-wants-to-
avoid-deportations-for-minor-crimes.html [https://perma.cc/G3PJ-QGUJM].
35 See Press Release, Manhattan Dist. Attorney's Office, supra note 34; 5 Boro Defenders,
FACEBOOK (June 3, 2017), supra note 31; 5 Boro Defenders (@5borodefenders), FACEBOOK (May
17, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/5borodefenders/ [https://perma.cc/D232-KMSL]
[hereinafter 5 Boro Defenders, FACEBOOK (May 17, 2017)]; 5 Boro Defenders
(@5borodefenders), FACEBOOK (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/5borodefenders/
[https://perma.ccW3PV-MVFP] [hereinafter 5 Boro Defenders, FACEBOOK (Aug. 23, 2017)].
36 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 50 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017); Carlos Menchaca & Julissa
Ferreras-Copeland, New York: A Sanctuary City with a Plan, GOTHAM GAZETTE, http://
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in fortifying protections for noncitizens.37 And yet, despite several
waves of legislation in New York City, there remain significant gaps
in coverage.3
8
At their most basic level, sanctuary protections try to shield some
noncitizens under some circumstances, from detection and removal
when they interact with local law enforcement.39 These protections
attempt to insulate the City's local criminal legal system from
entanglements with the federal government that have given rise to
the nationwide crimmigration system.
40
Since the 1980s, and more so after September 11, 2001, scholars
and activists have witnessed the consolidation of a crimmigration
system-the merging of previously distinct institutions, the criminal
legal system and the civil immigration system.41 This integration
occurred along two axes: horizontally, across agencies within the
federal government and vertically between state criminal legal
www.gothamgazette.coml?id=6660:new-york-a-sanctuary-city-with-a-plan [https://perma.cc
/HY48-TVMU].
31 See George Joseph, Mapping Trump's Coming War on Immigrant Sanctuary Cities,
CITYLAB (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/11/mapping-trumps-coming-
war-on-sanctuary-cities/507785/ [https://perma.cc/CJ7P-M57S].
38 See Tina Vasquez, The Who, What, Where, and Weaknesses of Sanctuary Cities (Updated),
REWIRE NEWS (Nov. 23, 2016, 3:06 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2016/11/23/weaknesses-
sanctuary-cities/ [https://perma.cc/5GPU-85NR]; infra notes 56-84 and accompanying text.
39 See Azadeh Shahshahani & Amy Pont, Sanctuary Policies: Local Resistance in the Face of
State Anti-Sanctuary Legislation, 21 CUNY L. REV. 225, 229-30 (2018).
The term 'sanctuary' as it relates to sanctuary policies, originates from the United States
in the 1980s when religious institutions protected Central American refugees from the
threat of deportation. At the end of the 20th century, Central American refugees fled war-
ravaged countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala. At the time, the Reagan
Administration supported the repressive governments from which the individuals were
fleeing, and as such, refugees' asylum claims were not approved. Religious institutions
provided legal assistance, food, medical care, and employment. Current sanctuary policies
are a mixture of legislation, ordinances, and policies adopted by states, localities, and
sheriffs' offices across the country. Sanctuary policies impose varying limitations on
cooperation with ICE, ranging from prohibiting law enforcement agencies from using
funds or personnel "to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for
immigration enforcement purposes" to prohibiting the release of any information
regarding a person's release date or court appearance dates in response to federal
inquiries.
Id.
40 See Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded, CNN (Mar. 26,
2018), https://www.cnn.com2Ol7/0 1/25/politics/sanctuary-cities-explaine dindex.html [https://
perma.cc/2VB2-KS4T].
41 See Teresa Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After
September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 94 (2005).
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systems and the federal government.42 C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia
Herndndez narrates the emergence of the crimmigration system:
Beginning in the 1980s ... the dominant distinguishing
characteristic between prospective immigrants who have been
welcomed and those who have been shunned has turned on
criminal activity. Convictions for a growing list of offenses
result in removal-the technical umbrella term for exclusion
and deportation. Sometimes commission-rather than
conviction-of such an offense is sufficient. At the same time,
immigration law enforcement has increasingly adopted the
securitized approach of criminal law enforcement.
43
State courts came to play a pivotal role in adjudicating who
remains and who is expelled, by supplying the bulk of convictions
used as grounds for removal.44 What counts as a criminal conviction
under immigration law has also broadened.45  "Almost every
immigration statute passed since [the 1980s] ... has expanded the
list of crimes leading to exclusion and deportation.'" 46 Categories of
convictions that serve as grounds for removal, such as "aggravated
felonies, crimes involving moral turpitude, and controlled substance
convictions" included what many would consider minor offenses.47 As
the Supreme Court recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky,48 "involvement
in criminal activity now frequently leads to 'presumptively
mandatory' removal.
'" 49
The federal immigration enforcement system not only depends on
state convictions to create grounds to expel noncitizens, but also on
state law enforcement's contact with noncitizens to identify
individuals eligible for removal.50 At the time of any arrest, as a
42 See id. at 91-93.
43 C6sar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia Herndndez, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457,
1458 (2014).
44 See id. at 1513-15.
45 See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 383-84 (2006).
46 Id. at 383.
47 Cade, supra note 8, at 1758.
48 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
49 Hernsndez, supra note 43, at 1467; see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369; Cade, supra note 8,
at 1810 ("Once noncitizens enter the criminal justice system, the odds of being funneled to
deportation proceedings through federal enforcement programs are high. Inevitably, the
government deports many noncitizens, including those with lawful status and substantial
community ties, on the basis of minor crimes of which the individual should not have been
convicted.").
50 See Herndndez, supra note 43, at 1483-84.
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matter of course, the arresting agency, often the local police, will send
all arrestees' fingerprints to the FBI. 51  Ever since the Bush
administration created the Secure Communities Program, briefly
replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program under President
Obama, the FBI has shared those fingerprints with the Department
of Homeland Services (DHS).52 With this biometric sharing, DHS can
identify whether someone in state custody-at a police precinct, jail
or prison-is eligible for removal, allowing the federal agency to
request that the local agency hold that person until ICE arrives.53
In response to this consolidation, sanctuary protections seek to
create a series of wedges between these increasingly integrated
institutions.54 In their survey of sanctuary protections, Christopher
Lasch and his co-authors identify several mechanisms that sanctuary
protections employ to isolate cities and states from the federal
government:
(1) barring investigation of civil and criminal immigration
violations by local law enforcement, (2) limiting compliance
with immigration detainers and immigration warrants, (3)
refusing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE")
access to local jails, (4) limiting local law enforcement's
disclosure of sensitive information, and (5) precluding local
participation in joint operations with federal immigration
enforcement.
55
In New York City, in the past five years, City Council passed
several pieces of legislation regulating city law enforcement agencies
achieving each of the five goals above.56 Two crucial points of contact
remain untouched: when the New York Police Department (NYPD)
61 See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y. 177, 181-82 (2008).
52 See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44627, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAMS 1, 11 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec
/R44627.pdf [https://perma.cc/86HD-R8DT]. For examples of New York City Council legislation
addressing fingerprinting and civil detainers, see N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 1558-A, § 1
(2017) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 9-205(2) (2019)); N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No.
1566-A, § 1 (2017) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y. CHARTER §§ 18(b), (d)(2)-(3)); N.Y.C., N.Y., Council
Int. No. 1578-A, § 1 (2017) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y. CHARTER § 18(g)(1)).
53 See KANDEL, supra note 52, at 11.
54 See Lasch et al., supra note 1, at 1745-46.
55 Id. at 1707.
5 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 1568-A, § 1 (2017) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § 10-178(b) (2019)); N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 487-A, § 1 (2014) (codified as N.Y.C.,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-154(b) (2019)); N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 486-A, § 4 (2014) (codified
as N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 9-131(h)(2) (2019)).
2019/2020]
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shares biometric data with the FBI and DHS, and any contact made
by DA offices.57 These shortcomings are not unique to the City,58 but
point to the limits of the dominant sanctuary framework, and the
difficulty of regulating county actors like DAs.
5 9
Detainer requests from DHS are a central target of sanctuary
legislation.60 If DHS suspects that someone in state custody is
eligible for removal, it can send a detainer, requesting that local
authorities detain that individual for up to 48 hours longer than she
would otherwise be held so that ICE can apprehend her.61 By 2017,
ICE issued nearly one million detainer requests nationally, "with
thousands issued to authorities in New York City."6 2 In 2012, City
Council passed legislation limiting the circumstances under which
the Department of Corrections (DOC) can honor ICE detainers: only
when the individual has a criminal record, prior immigration
violations, or poses a safety threat.6 3 The legislation, however,
authorized more detainer requests than lawmakers expected.6 4 City
Council narrowed the grounds for cooperation.
6 5
After the Third Circuit and federal district courts ruled that ICE
detainers were not binding,66 City Council passed legislation in
57 See Stephen Rex Brown, Manhattan DA Vance Alone Among City's District Attorneys in
Referring Defendants to ICE, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-metro-vance-ice-201901 10-story.html [https://perma.cc
/D547-ZTJN]; Ryan Devereaux & John Knefel, ICE Evades Sanctuary Rules by Using NYPD
Fingerprints to Find Immigrants and Send Them Call-In Letters, INTERCEPT (Apr. 16, 2018,
3:28 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/04/26/ice-sends-threatening-letters-to-immigrants-
increasing-climate-of-fear-in-new-york-city/ [https://perma.cc/T937-PF6N].
58 See Vasquez, supra note 38.
59 See LENA GRABER & NIKEI MARQUEZ, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., SEARCHING FOR
SANCTUARY: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S COUNTIES & THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH
DEPORTATIONS 1, 16 (2016) [hereinafter GRABER & MARQUEZ, SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY],
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuaryrepor tfinal-l-min.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AKY8-SV4V].
60 See Liz Robbins, In a 'Sanctuary City,' Immigrants Are Still at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/nyregion/sanctuary-cities-immigrants-ice.html
[https://perma.cc/CSJ2-26HX].
61 See KANDEL, supra note 52, at 11-12.
62 N.Y.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON IMMIGRATION ET AL., COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN SERVICES DIVISIONS 8 (Apr. 26, 2017).
63 See N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 656-A § 1 (2011) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 9-131(6) (2019)).
- See N.Y.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON IMMIGRATION ET AL., supra note 62, at 12-13.
65 See id.; N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 989 (2012) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 9-131(b)(1) (2019)); N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 982 (2012) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § 14-154 (b)(1) (2019)).
66 See Lasch et al., supra note 1, at 1732 (discussing litigation challenging the legality of
detainers); see also Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014) (ruling that ICE
detainer requests are not binding on states and localities, who may share liability when they
participate in wrongful immigration detentions).
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October 2014,67 once again limiting the circumstances under which
the NYPD or DOC could honor such requests from ICE. 68 The law
required ICE to present the NYPD and DOC a warrant from an
Article III judge, with one exception.69  The legislation also
constrained the DOC's ability to share information with ICE.
70
Advocates noted there were greater protections afforded to
noncitizens in DOC than in NYPD custody.71 Unlike the DOC, for
example, the law did not forbid the NYPD or the Department of
Probation from sharing information with DHS. 72
In the aftermath of the 2016 election, City Council created more
protections. A series of bills passed in 2017 tried to ensure uniformity
across city agencies. These laws barred all city agencies from
cooperating with federal immigration enforcement except in "limited
circumstances,'" 73 such as in counter-terrorism operations.74 The
legislation also banned local employees from being "deputized by ICE
67 See N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 989; N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 982 (eliminating
detainers lodged against those with open misdemeanor cases and those with misdemeanor
convictions that were more than ten years old).
68 See N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 486-A § 2 (2014) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 9-131(b)(1), (2) (2019)). Under this law, DOC is prohibited from honoring an ICE detainer
request, unless it is accompanied by a judicial warrant from an Article III federal judge, and
the individual has been convicted of a "violent or serious crime" within five years of the instant
arrest or is a possible match on the terrorist watch list. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 9-
131(a)(2), (b); see also KATHRYN 0. GREENBERG IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, NEW YORK CITY
NEW DETAINER DISCRETION LAW CHART AND PRACTICE ADVISORY 1 (2014), https://www
.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Practice-Advisory-2014-Detainer-
Discretion-Law-PEP.pdf [https://perma.cc/R352-EFV6] [hereinafter GREENBERG] (explaining
New York City's detainer discretion laws that took effect in 2014).
69 See GREENBERG, supra note 68, at 1.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 486-A, § 4; GREENBERG, supra note 68, at 1.
73 See N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 1568-A § 1 (2017) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 10-178 (2019)) (prohibiting, inter alia, City employees from accepting requests from federal
law enforcement to assist in immigration enforcement, such as 278(g) agreements with ICE);
N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 1579-A § 1 (2017) (codified as N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 12-
208 (2019)) (preventing City agencies from granting access to federal and out of state law
enforcement from accessing non-public areas without a warrant or cooperation with NYPD, or
other limited circumstances); N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 1558-A § 1 (2017) (codified as
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 9-205 (2019)); Press Release, Office of the Mayor, De Blasio
Administration Announces Citywide Guidance and NYPD Protocol to Codify Restrictions on
Assistance with Federal Immigration Enforcement (Jan. 31, 2018), https://wwwl.nyc.gov
/office -of-the- mayor/news/075- 18/de-blasio-administration-citywide -guidance-nyp d-protecol-
codify-restrictions-on [https://perma.cc/XM5H-MHQ7].
74 See N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No. 1558-A § 1 ; see also Press Release, Office of the Mayor,
supra note 73 ("City agencies, including the NYPD, will continue to cooperate with federal law
enforcement agencies in certain circumstances, including... by sharing information about
individuals in the City's criminal custody who have been convicted of one of approximately 170
qualifying violent or serious felonies under the City's existing laws on immigration detainer
requests.').
250 Albany Law Review [Vol. 83.1
to perform immigration enforcement," under what are known as
287(g) agreements.
7 5
Significantly, these City laws have never regulated DA offices. DA
offices are not City agencies, but county actors.7 6 Like many other
county level actors, DAs are notably absent from conversations about
policing and sanctuary protections.7 7 "Generally, city ordinances do
not govern county level agencies or officials, and sanctuary city laws
can be undermined by county policy and practice. s78 Thus, as some
City law enforcement agencies have moved towards greater
autonomy from the federal government, DA offices have lagged. In
fact, the press revealed that the Manhattan District Attorney has a
policy of referring individuals to ICE under certain circumstances,
including after an acquittal at trial.
7 9
Besides a complete absence of sanctuary protections governing
DAs, the initial point of contact between the NYPD and DHS remains
untouched-the NYPD still shares arrestees' fingerprints with the
FBI, and in turn with DHS.8 0 The NYPD could decline to transmit
the fingerprints to the FBI, as there is no obligation for the NYPD to
do so.81 But no municipality or state has explored the option.
8 2
Commentators have noted that such an outcome is unlikely because
local police officers rely heavily on the FBI's crime database.
8 3
75 Press Release, Office of the Mayor, supra note 73; see also N.Y.C., N.Y., Council Int. No.
1568-A (2017).
76 Article XIII of the New York State Constitution regulates the terms of district attorneys.
See N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 13(a) ("In each county a district attorney shall be chosen by the
electors once in every three or four years as the legislature shall direct.'). A DA is removable
by the governor. N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 13(b) ("Any district attorney who shall fail faithfully
to prosecute a person charged with the violation in his or her county of any provision of this
article which may come to his or her knowledge, shall be removed from office by the governor,
after due notice and an opportunity of being heard in his or her defense."); accord Hoerger v.
Spota, 997 N.E.2d 1229, 1230 (N.Y. 2013) (per curiam) ("[A] district attorney is subject to
removal from office, not by county officials, but by the Governor."). Because the office is created
by the constitution, the DA's office is considered a state office. Drake v. City of Rochester, 408
N.Y.S.2d 847, 853, 854 (Sup. Ct. 1978), affd, 429 N.Y.S.2d 394 (App. Div. 1980). Nonetheless,
the county is liable for a DA's tortious conduct, and pays the office's salary. See Whitmore v.
State, 389 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Fisher v. State, 176 N.E.2d 72 (N.Y. 1961);
Ritter v. State, 128 N.Y.S.2d 830 (App. Div. 1954); Fishbein v. State, 125 N.Y.S.2d 845 (App.
Div. 1953)).
77 See GRABER & MARQUEZ, SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY, supra note 59, at 1, 3 ("Counties,
not cities, are the most important policy-makers in terms of establishing sanctuary policies."
(emphasis removed)).
78 Id. at 16.
79 See Brown, supra note 57.
80 See Devereaux & Knefel, supra note 57.
81 See Christine N. Cimini, Hands Off Our Fingerprints: State, Local, and Individual
Defiance of Federal Immigration Enforcement, 47 CONN. L. REV. 101, 135 (2014).
82 See id.
83 See, e.g., id.
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The City's sanctuary protections also do not cover individuals with
certain criminal histories. The City will heed detainer requests for
anyone convicted of "one of approximately 170 qualifying violent or
serious felonies."
8 4
II. PRESIDENT TRUMP'S JANUARY 25, 2017, EXECUTIVE ORDER
On January 25, 2017, President Trump signed two EOs governing
immigration policy. The one discussed here prioritized removing any
individual without lawful immigration status accused or convicted of
a crime under federal law.8 5 It exposed noncitizens to heightened and
new risks, against which current sanctuary policies offered little
protection.
6
The EO threatened to expose far more people to removal than
under the previous administration,8 7 which itself set a record,
earning President Obama the title of Deporter-in-Chief.8 8 Under the
Obama administration, although misdemeanor convictions were also
grounds for removal, the kind and number of convictions mattered.8 9
Individuals with an aggravated felony as defined in Section
1101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act were "Priority
1," which could entail a single theft offense with a suspended one-
84 See Press Release, Office of the Mayor, supra note 73.
85 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 25, 2017).
In executing faithfully the immigration laws of the United States, the Secretary of
Homeland Security (Secretary) shall prioritize for removal those aliens described by the
Congress in sections 212(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6)(C), 235, and 237(a)(2) and (4) of the INA
(8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6)(C), 1225, and 1227(a)(2) and (4)), as well as
removable aliens who: (a) Have been convicted of any criminal offense; (b) Have been
charged with any criminal offense, where such charge has not been resolved; (c) Have
committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense.
Id.
86 See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER "ENHANCING PUBLIC
SAFETY IN THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES" 1 (2017), https://www.americanimmigration
council.org/sites/default/files/researcIlsummary-of executive order enhancing-public safety
in the interior of the united states.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3Z9-NYAE].
87 See Betsy Woodruff, Trump Looks Ready to Outdo 'Deporter-in-Chief' Obama, DAILY
BEAST (Feb. 14, 2017, 1:03 AM) https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-looks-ready-to-outdo-
deporter-in-chief-obama [https://perma.cc/E4QK-2WEZ].
88 See Muzaffar Chishti et al., The Obama Record on Deportations: Deporter in Chief or Not?,
MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/obama-record-
deportations-deporter-chief-or-not [https://perma.cc/X92Y-NPM3].
89 See JULIANA MORGAN-TROSTLE ET AL., THE STATE OF BLACK IMMIGRANTS, pt. II, at 14
(2018), http://www.stateofblackimmigrants.comlassets/sobi-fullreport-jan22.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8FWG-ANRX] [hereinafter MORGAN-TROSTLE ET AL., THE STATE OF BLACK IMMIGRANTS].
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year sentence, without any jail time.90  "Priority 2" included
individuals with three or more misdemeanor offenses, amongst other
grounds.9 1 This hierarchy in removability gave expression to the
Obama administration's "felons, not families" policy, which
perpetuated a securitized approach to immigration enforcement.
92
Although the Obama administration's priorities exposed
individuals to removal for minor offenses, the 2017 EO went further.
Even "[d]ispositions considered to be . . . 'non-criminal"' in New York
State or a pending charge could make the individual a priority for
deportation.9 3 Criminal immigration specialists cautioned that the
EO made "no distinction between the types of crime or level of
offenses that will make a person a target for deportation.'" 94 "For
example, DHS considers New York violations to be misdemeanor
convictions."95 Violations, specifically New York Penal Law section
240.20-disorderly conduct-is a common charge used to resolve
misdemeanor cases, which does not give or create a criminal record
in New York State.96 A disorderly conduct plea serves as an essential
currency for resolution of low-level cases.97 But it can lead to removal
based on how federal law categorizes this offense, depending on the
individual's immigration status.
98
The Trump administration's announced priorities did not change
immigration law and therefore did not alter who is legally removable.
90 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Customs & Border Prot.,
R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., & Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Policy, U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec. 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/14 1120 memo-prosecutorial discretion.pdf [https://perma.ccMSX8-SLBY] ("Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants.").
91 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson to Thomas S. Winkowski, R. Gil
Kerlikowske, Leon Rodriguez, & Alan D. Bersin, supra note 90, at 3-4.
92 See 2014 Obama Immigration National Address, supra note 23.
93 IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, ADVISING IMMIGRANT CLIENTS AFTER PRESIDENT TRUMP'S
1.25.17 EXECUTIVE ORDERS: FAQS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 2 (2017) [hereinafter
ADVISING IMMIGRANT CLIENTS], https://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2 017
/01/IDP-Post-Trump-EOs-FAQs-for-defenders- 1.27.17.pdf [https://perma.ccW464-M3A9].
94 Id. at 2 (emphasis removed).
95 Id. (emphasis removed).
96 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20 (McKinney 2019); Frankie Herrmann, Building A Fair and
Just New York: Decriminalize Transactional Sex, 15 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 51, 73
(2018).
91 See Mari Byrne, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2968,
2972 (2010).
98 See Juan C. Quevedo, The Troubling Case(s) of Noncitizens: Immigration Enforcement
Through the Criminal Justice System and the Effect on Families, 10 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 386,
405, 406-07 (2015) (noting that immigration courts have characterized relatively minor crimes
as crimes involving moral turpitude, which are removable offenses).
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But the EO signaled that enforcement would expand significantly,
putting more people at risk for removal.99 Criminal immigration
specialists warned, "any 'removable' person who has been accused or
convicted of a crime is now a priority for deportation."' 100 The EO also
directed ICE to seek detainers for any removable person, unlike the
previous administration's written policy which purported to target
only those who fell within the enumerated priorities.101
The lowered threshold for removal under the 2017 EO underscored
the inadequacy of the main tools a defense attorney has to prevent
her client from being deported.102
As part of the consolidation of the crimmigration system, DHS
makes decisions about granting residency, citizenship, or relief from
adverse action based on an individual's criminal record. The
"cleaner" the record the better the chances of getting the desired
immigration benefit.103 Each interaction with law enforcement
leaves a mark, however fleeting.10 4 A pending criminal charge leaves
a mark that will later be erased if the case is dismissed or the person
is acquitted at trial.10 5 No charge at all is better than a charge, even
if temporary. A temporary charge is better than a conviction, which
leaves an indelible mark in New York State.106 In the context of civil
immigration enforcement, a conviction can create grounds for
removal, or else it alerts immigration authorities to someone being in
the country without documentation. 107
In response, a defense attorney is required to inform her client of
the potential immigration consequences of taking a specific a plea or
going to trial.108 But as an attorney might explain to a client, "I don't
have a crystal ball" to predict how immigration authorities might act,
particularly if the immigration benefit is granted by an act of
99 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
100 See ADVISING IMMIGRANT CLIENTS, supra note 93, at 1.
101 See id. at 1-2; MORGAN-TROSTLE ET AL., supra note 89, at 14; 2014 Obama Immigration
National Address, supra note 23.
102 See Jennifer Welch, Comment, Defending Against Deportation: Equipping Public
Defenders to Represent Noncitizens Effectively, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 561 (2004).
103 See id. at 2.
104 See Quevedo, supra note 98, at 392-95.
105 In New York State, records from any criminal prosecution terminated in an individual's
favor or by way of a noncriminal conviction shall be sealed. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§§ 160.50, 160.55, 170.55, 170.56 (McKinney 2019); see also Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353
U.S. 232, 241 (1957) ('The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any,
probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing
more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense.").
106 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.59 (McKinney 2019).
107 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
108 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
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discretion. A defense attorney is also expected try to strike a harm
reducing plea.109 But there is no equality of arms in the American
criminal legal system. A good outcome will depend on the
prosecutor's inclination. The defense has limited leverage in plea
negotiations. °10 In sum, these measures have never assured the
safety of noncitizens facing criminal prosecution. The EO announced
DHS's mandate for mass expulsion targeting undocumented persons
for removal as soon as they stand criminally accused.111 This
increased urgency impelled the organizers to advance more
comprehensive protections earlier in the life of a criminal case.
A. A New Demand for Sanctuary
At frequent demonstrations in January 2017, both before and after
Donald Trump's inauguration, demonstrators exhorted state and city
representatives to take steps, when possible, to thwart the new
administration's policy priorities.112 In particular, there was a broad
and energetic interest in strengthening sanctuary city protections,
both in private institutions, like private universities, and in cities
and states at large.113 Over 400 jurisdictions, including those that
make up New York City, took steps to enhance "limitations on
engaging in immigration enforcement."1 14 To those with some
familiarity of the crimmigration system, it was also clear, however,
that the noncooperation alone-the dominant approach for devising
sanctuary protections-would do little to stymie the federal
109 NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
REPRESENTATION 8.4(a)(4) (1995), http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards
/Performance Guidelines.
110 See, e.g., id. at 373.
111 See ADVISING IMMIGRANT CLIENTS, supra note 93, at 1.
112 See 5 Boro Defs., Weekly Update #5: The Toll of Broken Windows Policing & Prosecution
(March 31, 2017), MEDIUM (Mar. 31, 2017), https://medium.com/@5BoroDefenders/weekly-
update-5-the-toll-of-broken-windows -policing-prosecution-march-31- 2017-2f510ba9ca77
[https://perma.cc/EJ5D-BSSB] [hereinafter 5 Boro Defs., Weekly Update #5]; Protesters Across
U.S. Denounce Trump Immigration Order, CBS NEWS (Jan. 29, 2017, 3:16 PM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-immigration-order-sows-chaos-at-airports-outrage-at-
protests/ [https://perma.cc/M8NC-US3K].
113 See, e.g., Ashley Cleek, Weighing the Risks of a 'Sanctuary' Campus, PRI (Feb. 16, 2017,
5:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-02-16/weighing-risks-sanctuary-campus [https://
perma.ccWZ8G-HTAL]; Phil McCausland, 'Sanctuary Cities' Vow to Resist Trump Order
Despite Funding Threat, NBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2017, 10:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news
/us-news/sanctuary-cities-vow-resist-trump-order- despite-funding-threat-n712251 [https://
perma.cc/MT9H-PQ4Z]; Katy Steinmetz, 7 Ways California Is Fighting Back Against President
Trump's Administration, TIME (Apr. 6, 2017), http://time.com/4725971/california-resisting-
trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/JLF7-JCMN].
114 See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., THE RISE OF SANCTUARY 1, 18 (2018), https://
www.ilrc.org/rise-sanctuary [https://perma.cc/T7HQ-KX2E].
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government's plans for mass removal. To public defenders, tinkering
with information sharing or cooperation protocol processes appeared
inadequate.115 Rather than regulating law enforcement, organizers
wanted to push for measures that would shrink the pool of
individuals at risk for removal by shrinking prosecutors' carceral
reach.116 This preference for shrinking reflected the organizers'
normative commitment to abolition and its empirical foundations. " 7
Both those who organized and many who endorsed the campaign
recognized the harms created by a securitized approach to
immigration,18  and rejected the categorical and irreversible
exclusion of individuals from membership because of their criminal
history, nationality, or race.119 Given the administration's focus on
individuals charged and convicted with crimes,120 prosecutors seemed
like an obvious target. While they were notably missing from the
conversation about sanctuary policies, they had the power to fortify
state autonomy.'21
New York City's DAs publicly acknowledged the new social and
political climate after the 2016 election. 22 Specifically, five of the
city's DAs declared they would aggressively prosecute hate crimes
after the election. 23 Similarly, after the Trump administration
rescinded the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program, Manhattan DA Cyrus Vance issued a statement that
criticized the move, stating it jeopardized the cooperation of
undocumented crime witnesses.24  Public defenders sought to
115 See Welch, supra note 102, at 561.
116 See 5 Boro Defs., Weekly Update #5, supra note 112.
"7 See Quevedo, supra note 98, at 406-07; 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note
5.
118 See ADVISING IMMIGRANT CLIENTS, supra note 93, at 1; Quevedo, supra note 98, at 386
(stating that deportation of non-citizens tears families apart).
119 See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 114, at 2.
120 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 25, 2017).
121 Cf. Richard Gonzales, Federal Appeals Panel Upholds California 'Sanctuary State' Law,
NPR (April 18, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/18/714882333/federal-appeals-
panel-upholds-california-sanctuary-state-law [https://perma.cc/L7YD-2NLW].
122 See Press Release, Manhattan Dist. Attorney's Office, Statement by District Attorneys
Richard A. Brown, Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., Darcel D. Clark, Michael E. McMahon, and Eric
Gonzalez (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.manhattanda.org/statement-district-attorneys-richard-
brown-cyrus-r-vance-jr-darcel-d-clark-michael-e-nI [https://perma.cc/7ALG-9NCZ].
123 See id.
124 See Press Release, Manhattan Dist. Attorney's Office, Statement by Manhattan District
Attorney Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. on Decision Regarding Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals Policy (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www. manhattanda.org/statement-manhattan-district-
attorney-cyrus-r-vance-jr-decision-regarding-deferred-act/ [https://perma.cc/29K5-4Z4J]
("Most distressingly, this action will surely widen the gap between law enforcement and a
vulnerable population that is already disproportionately affected by crime, dissuading victims
and witnesses from reporting real crimes and public safety threats for fear of deportation. I
255
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capitalize on their adversaries' shared concerns about the new federal
administration and brought them into the citywide conversation
about strengthening sanctuary protections.
125
Public defenders in New York City are organized in two ways.
Most are members of a union, the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys,
which is a local of the United Autoworkers.126 More informally, since
2002, some public defenders have coalesced under the banner of 5
Boro Defenders, which provides a space for attorneys to reflect on the
political and ethical dimensions of their work, and to share strategies
to creatively counter the systemic injustices of the criminal legal
system.127 Under both banners, public defenders in New York City
are actively involved in political mobilization, whether legislative
advocacy, support for clemency, or direct action.
128
Launched on January 30, 2017, by 5 Boro Defenders, the
#NYCdontprosecute campaign asked members of the public to call
their elected DA and ask them to no longer prosecute broken windows
offenses.
129
We are calling on you to contact your borough's District
Attorney, and ask them for a moratorium on broken windows
prosecutions. These include offenses like: jumping the
subway turnstile, selling DVD's on the street, forgetting to
pay a fine, trespassing in a NYCHA building and having a
small amount of marijuana.
These arrests and prosecutions do not make us safer, and
already disproportionately burden poor communities of color,
specifically [B]lack people, through mass incarceration. But
now under Trump these prosecutions are having devastating
consequences for our non-citizen community members. In
fact, under the new Executive Order, just being accused of a
want to assure undocumented New Yorkers today that my Office remains a safe place to report
crime.").
125 See, e.g., 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
126 See About, ASS'N LEGAL AID AITTYS, http://www.alaa.org/index.php/aboud [https://perma
.cc/GF7P-4JMR].
127 See 5 Boro Defenders, MEDIUM, https://medium.com/@5BoroDefenders [https://perma.cc
/4ECU-RQ3X].
128 See Gwynne Hogan, Public Defenders Walk Out of Bronx Courthouse After College
Student Detained By ICE, WNYC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.wnyc.org/story/public-
defenders-walk-out-bronx-courthouse-after-college-student-detained-ice/ [https://perma.cc
/S7JP-3VU34]; Noah Hurowitz & Felipe de la Hoz, Legal Aid Lawyers Stage Walkout After Yet
Another ICE Court Arrest, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.villagevoice.com/2017
/11/28/legal- aid-lawyers-stage -walkout-after-yet-another-ice-court-arrest/ [https://perma.cc
/V2RY-ENK6].
129 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
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crime could lead to deportation. Until we know what this
means for Trump's immigration enforcement, we are asking
the District Attorneys to stop prosecuting broken windows
offenses. 130
Over forty-three organizations endorsed the call, representing a
wide range of progressive voices, from grassroots community-based
organizations to unions of legal aid professionals.131 Organizers
suggested callers follow the script below when they called their local
DA's office:
Hi, my name is . Your office represents "the people of
the state of NY" in the borough of __ and I'm calling as
one of your constituents. With Donald Trump's latest
Executive Order, all non-citizen New Yorkers face new and
grave threats of deportation just by being charged with a
crime. I'm calling on you to uphold your duty to protect the
people of New York with a moratorium on prosecuting broken
windows offenses and quality of life crimes. The harm of
deportation now arises at the charging stage, even if the case
is later dismissed or the person given a non-criminal violation
offer. The DA's office has enormous discretionary power to act
on behalf of the people of this state, and we ask you to use your
discretion in service of our collective interests for a strong,
diverse and welcoming New York.1
32
130 Id. (emphasis omitted).
131 Supporting organizations included: Attorneys of Color Caucus-ACLA, Arab American
Association of New York, Audre Lorde Project, Black Alliance for Just Immigration, Black
Moveipent-Law Project, Brooklyn Community Bail Fund, The Bronx Defenders, CAAAV
(Organizing Asian Communities), Cardozo Criminal Defense Clinic, Immigration Justice
Clinic, Cardozo School of Law, Cardozo Minority Law Student Alliance, Coalition To End
Broken Windows, Communities United for Police Reform (CPR), Community Voices Heard
Action, Community Voices Heard Power, CUNY Defenders Clinic, DRUM-Desis Rising Up &
Moving, El Grito, Equality for Flatbush: E4F, FIERCE!, Gay Asian Pacific Islander Men of New
York (GAPIMNY), ICE-FREE NYC, Immigrant Defense Project, Jews for Racial and Economic
Justice [JFREJ], JustLeadership USA, Legal Services Staff Association UAW/NOLSW Local
2320, MORE UFT (Movement of Rank and File Educators), Muslim Democratic Club of New
York, National Lawyers Guild New York City, New York City Anti-Violence Project, New York
Civil Liberties Union-NYCLU, The New York Immigration Coalition, New York State
Immigrant Action Fund, NYC Metro Area Law Student Coalition, NYCoRE (New York
Collective of Radical Educators), New Yorkers for Social Justice PAC, Peter Cicchino Youth
Project (PCYP), Riders Alliance, Sylvia Rivera Law Project (SRLP), Teachdream, Trans Justice




By the end of March 2017, the campaign logged 769 calls.133
The campaign asked specifically for a moratorium on broken
windows prosecutions to draw attention to the heightened sense of
urgency for noncitizens, and the change in federal enforcement
priorities.13 4  Prosecutors could decide in their Early Case
Assessment Bureau (ECAB), where cases are initially screened and
complaints are drafted, to decline to prosecute cases, without judicial
or external interference.1 35 Organizers believed that if a moratorium
were successfully implemented, showing that not prosecuting such
offenses did not threaten public safety, there would be greater
support for permanently nullifying, if not legislatively
decriminalizing such charges.
136
The campaign explained the call for a moratorium on broken
windows prosecutions:
Under broken windows policing, poor folks of color,
particularly Black and Latinx, already struggling to get by,
are systematically targeted by law enforcement. This kind of
policing began at a time when social welfare spending in New
York City was reaching new lows, pushing those already on
the margins into the streets, and into economic precarity.
They are stigmatized as being undesirable to the city and
unruly. Being poor and being involved in the informal sector
became criminalized; selling DVD's on Canal Street, jumping
the turnstile to get to work, and sleeping in the bank vestibule
all have become crimes, for which individuals face arrest after
arrest, conviction after conviction.
The lives of those targeted by broken windows policing are
made further precarious from this regular involvement of the
police and the courts. They are constantly indebted owing jail
time, fees, surcharges and days of community service. Many
who have studied this history and reality have noted this kind
of policing leads to the criminal courts managing and
supervising poor communities of color, of which immigrants
make up a sizeable proportion. These prosecutions serve as a
13. See 5 Boro Defs., Weekly Update #5, supra note 112.
134 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
135 See MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, MODELS FOR INNOVATION: THE MANHATTAN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 2010-2018, at 4 (2018), https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-
contentuploads/2018/03/Models-For-Innovation-Report-l.pdf [https://perma.ccMA9G-RYMF]
[hereinafter MODELS FOR INNOVATION]; John Eligon, In a Complaint Room, a Prosecutor's-Eye
View of Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at A16.
136 See 5 Boro Defs., FAQ, supra note 8.
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means of marking Brown and Black bodies with criminal
records, and as a means of instituting state supervision and
discipline. The harm of these prosecutions is now heightened
for non-citizens, as they face the additional threat of
deportation for these low level offenses. 1
37
The public call to action described the problem of broken windows
policing by referring to the lived experiences of those directly
impacted. Rather than taking the police and prosecutor's view of
broken windows as a necessary tool to preserve public order, the
public call framed the broken windows policing strategy as one
designed to manage a population of New Yorkers who were deemed
unworthy of services, support, and care.
III. STANDING ON SHOULDERS
Importantly, the campaign emerged out of a rich tradition of local
organizing in opposition to broken windows policing and the carceral
state more broadly. The campaign's unique contribution was to
amplify concerns from the police accountability and immigrant rights
movements, and identify a new kind of remedy from an actor whose
role has remained underappreciated.138 In identifying the prosecutor
as a source for new protections, the campaign married defenders'
insights into how broken windows prosecutions unfold in court with
the consensus built by over a decade of community mobilization about
the harms of zero-tolerance policing and the unique vulnerabilities
noncitizens faced. 139
A. A Brief History of Broken Windows Policing and Its Opposition
Police Commissioner William Bratton and Mayor Rudy Giuliani
introduced broken windows policing to New York City in the early
1990s.140 Police Strategy No. 5 established this new policing regime,
which identified "low-level offenses as an intrinsically important
137 Id. (emphasis omitted).
138 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
139 See K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 300-02, 306 (2009); 5 Boro
Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5; 5 Boro Defs., FAQ, supra note 8.
140 See William McGurn, The Idea that Made America's Cities Safer, WALL STREET J. (Dec.




enforcement priority."141  The strategy document embraced the
eponymous theory authored by academics George L. Kelling and
James Q. Wilson, declaring that "disorder and crime are usually
inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence."142 As Issa
Kohler-Hausmann explains, "[T]he new policing tactics rolled out in
the early 1990s under the Broken Windows banner called for not only
more frequent enforcement actions against low-level offenses, but
also more formal and intense police responses."143 Crime statistics
increasingly drove officer and precinct performance, which gave rise
to secret quotas for low-level arrests and summonses.144 The new
approach was first applied to subway stations where commanding
officers encouraged officers on patrol to issue summonses or perform
arrests for fare evasion.1 45 The approach was then applied to the
streets where officers aggressively enforced rules against riding
bicycles on the sidewalk or urinating in public.146
In 2017, at the time of the campaign, the NYPD identified the
following charges as quality-of-life offenses, the term it uses for low-
level offenses: vandalism; possession of controlled substances,
marijuana, or unstamped cigarettes; theft of transportation services
(not paying subway or bus fare); petit larceny; gambling; trespassing;
public lewdness; loitering, including for the purposes of prostitution'
begging; panhandling; promoting (.i.e., patronizing) prostitution;
resisting arrest; unlicensed general vending; and unlicensed
driving.14
7
Bratton's new enforcement approach led to an explosion of arrests
for low-level offenses.1 48 Misdemeanor arrests in the city surged
drastically.1 49 There were 187,385 misdemeanor arrests in 1994, the
year Bratton implemented his new methods.150 By 2010, there were
292,219 misdemeanor arrests per year.1 51 These numbers do not
include the thousands of stops performed and summonses issued that
141 ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL
IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 26 (2018).
142 Id. at 27.
143 Id. at 37.
144 See id. at 40-41, 281 n.71.
145 See WILLIAM J. BRATTON, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, BROKEN WINDOWS AND QUALITY-OF-LIFE
POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY 1 (2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf
/analysis-and planning/qol.pdf [https://perma.cc/527B-8FXX] [hereinafter BRATTON, QUALITY-
OF-LIFE POLICING].
146 See id. at 1, 3, 27.
147 See id. at 6.
148 See id. at 2.
149 See id.
150 Id. at 12.
151 Id.
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were not reported until recently.15 2 Importantly, these figures also
do not capture the disruptions, fines, lost time, pain and humiliation
of these arrests and charges for those targeted and their families. 153
Since 2010, the number of misdemeanor arrests have decreased, an
outcome of NYPD's self-described "recalibration," prompted by
community pressure and federal court monitoring. 154
From its inception, broken windows policing was inherently
excessive in several ways. Law enforcement directed its resources to
managing public disorder rather than apprehending normatively
culpable actors.155 Unruly conduct was criminalized not because it
was inherently criminal or caused interpersonal harm, but because
of the potential for serious crime it represented.156 The punishment
for broken windows offenses was, thus, not supposed to be
proportionate to the instant offense because it always contemplated
future criminality and deterrence. The policing strategy also had a
disproportionate impact on communities of color.157 Its empirical
claims were gradually debunked, making its costs harder to justify. 158
Since 1994, those arrested for low-level offenses have been
consistently and overwhelmingly Black, Latinx, and indigent.159
"Black and Latinx New Yorkers are... more likely to be issued
summonses than be let go with a warning. 160 In a study of 1.5 million
152 See Criminal and Civil Court Summons Reports, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, https://
wwwl.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/c-summons.page [https://perma.cc/7RAS-
A7NF]; Stop, Question and Frisk Data, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, https://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/nypd
/stats/reports-analysis/stopfrisk.page [https://perma.cc/XL64-TFTS].
153 Cf. BRATTON, QUALITY-OF-LIFE POLICING, supra note 145, at 10, 11 ('"The report...
explains, in detail, what types of arrests are made and what types of summons are issued-in
what numbers and for what offenses.").
154 See id. at 12; WILLIAM J. BRATTON, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, BROKEN WINDOWS Is NOT
BROKEN: THE NYPD RESPONSE TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT ON QUALITY-OF-LIFE
ENFORCEMENT 27, 31 (2016) https://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/broken windows
is_not broken.pdf [https://perma.ccV2UK-LHGV] [hereinafter BRATTON, BROKEN WINDOWS
IS NOT BROKEN] ("The NYPD is shifting away from quantity-driven enforcement towards
targeted, quality arrests.").
155 See BRATTON, QUALITY-OF-LIFE POLICING, supra note 145, at 1-2, 3.
5 See id.; Brittany Fritsch, Note, Broken Windows Is a Broken Policy, 47 U. TOL. L. REV.
767, 773-74 (2016).
157 See 5 Boro Defs., FAQ, supra note 8; Testimony Before City Council Public Safety &
Courts and Legal Services Committees on Summons Court Operations and Impact, N.Y. C.L.
UNION (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/testimony-city-council-public-
safety-courts-and-legal-services-committees-summons-court [https://perma.cc/FYU7-7PZ9]
[hereinafter Testimony Before City Council Public Safety & Courts and Legal Services
Committees].
158 See Fritsch, supra note 156, at 774; 5 Boro Defs., FAQ, supra note 8.
159 See BRATTON, BROKEN WINDOWS IS NOT BROKEN, supra note 154, at 29; Fritsch, supra
note 156, at 775; 5 Boro Defs., FAQ, supra note 8.
560 Brief of the Legal Aid Society et al. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 26, Vargas v. City
of New York, No. 150556-2011 (N.Y. App. Div. May 14, 2018).
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summonses issued by the NYPD between 2002 and 2013, "nearly 85
percent of summons recipients were [B]lack or Latin[x]. '"161 "More
summons are issued in neighborhoods with high concentrations of
Black and Latinx residents, a fact the NYPD concedes."'162 Although
"marijuana use is more prevalent among White people than people of
color, Black and Latin[x] New Yorkers comprise 86 percent of those
charged with misdemeanor marijuana offenses in New York City."
163
Similarly, Black men are most likely to be arrested for fare evasion
than any other racial category, even controlling for poverty levels.
164
These disparities have persisted, despite the NYPD's recalibration.
65
The NYPD has consistently attributed the historic decrease in the
City's general crime and homicide rates to broken windows
policing.166 'By applying summonses to violations and arrests to
misdemeanor crimes, rather than looking the other way because
161 Id. (alteration in original).
162 Id.
The most common offenses were: consumption of alcohol (1.6 million), disorderly conduct
(1 million), public urination (334,000), bicycling on the sidewalk (296,000) and operation
of a motor vehicle in violation of the safety rules (213,000).The News found the correlation
between race and summonses was not strong for offenses like motor vehicle violations and
unlawful possession of alcohol for a minor. But others-like spitting, disorderly conduct,
loitering, open container and failure to have a dog license-were more likely to be doled
out in predominately black and Hispanic precincts.
Sarah Ryley et al., Daily News Analysis Finds Racial Disparities in Summonses for Minor
Violations in 'Broken Windows' Policing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2014, 2:00 AM), https://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/summons-broken-windows-racial-disparity-garner-article-i
.1890567 [https://perma.cc/92QC-Q3T7].
163 Brief of the Legal Aid Society et al., supra note 160, at 29; see also DRUG POLICY ALL. &
MARIJUANA ARREST RESEARCH PROJECT, UNJUST AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL: 60,000 JIM CROW
MARIJUANA ARRESTS IN MAYOR DE BLASIO'S NEW YORK 3, 6, 7 (2017), https://
www. drugpolicy.org/sites/default/filesMarijuana-Arrests-NYC-Unjust-Unconstitutional-
July2017_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JYH-F5HH] (finding that the targeting of Black and Latinx
youth for marijuana and other low-level arrests has persisted at the citywide level for nearly
thirty years); Erin Durkin, NYPD Under Fire After Stats Reveal 86% of Marijuana Arrests in
City Are of Black or Latino People, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018, 6:13 PM), https://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/summons-broken-windows-racial-disparity-garner-article-
1.1890567 [https://perma.cc/5NHF-FLG7] ("[Diespite a large drop in marijuana busts, the
overwhelming majority of those arrested-86%-are black and Latino."); Testimony Before City
Council Public Safety & Courts and Legal Services Committees, supra note 157 ("Black and
Latino New Yorkers comprise 86 percent of those charged with misdemeanor marijuana
offenses in New York City.").
16 See HAROLD STOLPER & JEFF JONES, CMTY. SERV. SOC'Y, THE CRIME OF BEING SHORT
$2.75: POLICING COMMUNITIES OF COLOR AT THE TURNSTILE 2 (2017), https://smhttp-ssl-
58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/Fare-EvasionFINAL 10_6 17_smaller.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A7UV-K2XU].
16 See Brief of the Legal Aid Society et al., supra note 160, at 33; BRATTON, BROKEN
WINDOWS IS NOT BROKEN, supra note 154, at 31.
166 See BRATTON, BROKEN WINDOWS IS NOT BROKEN, supra note 154, at 29, 30, 31.
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these offenses are "too insignificant," officers were correcting
conditions early,' the NYPD reported in 2015, noting that there were
60,000 fewer felony arrests in 2014 than there were twenty years
earlier."167 Since its inception, scholars have called into question the
theory's empirical claims.168 In particular, there is no evidence the
increase in low-level arrests reduced serious violent or property
crimes.169 Nor did the decrease in low-level arrests and summonses
lead to an increase in the felony crime rate.170 The NYPD's own
inspector general noted the lack of any association between low-level
arrests and the felony crime rate.
1 71
Out of the growing frustration and pain from the police's zero
tolerance approach, several movements for accountability and reform
have emerged.1 72 A comprehensive account of the history of activism
against broken windows policing needs to be written, but some of the
most prominent threads over the last ten years provide insight into
the power of those movements and the gains they achieved. They set
167 N.Y. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
IMPLICATIONS OF "BROKEN WINDOWS" POLICING IN NYC AND GENERAL NYPD ACCOUNTABILITY
TO THE PUBLIC iv (2018) [hereinafter THE CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF "BROKEN WINDOWS"
POLICING IN NYC] (quoting BRATrON, QUALITY-OF-LIFE POLICING, supra note 145, at 3).
168 See, e.g., Fritsch, supra note 156, at 774; Nicole Kayley Michelle Melenka, Exploring the
Long-Term Impact of a Foot Patrol Policing Initiative in North Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada 9, 10 (Apr. 21, 2016) (unpublished M.A thesis, Simon Fraser University), http://
summit.sfu.ca/system/files/iritems 1/16418/etd9585_NMelenka.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BNK-
KK8P].
169 See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York
City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 315 (2006) [hereinafter Harcourt
& Ludwig, Broken Windows]; Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken
Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York 2-3 (Chi. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 142, 2006), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1250&context=public law and-legal-theory [https://permacc/6VYC-
SNGD] [hereinafter Harcourt & Ludwig, Reefer Madness] (demonstrating no relationship
between arrest for marijuana in public view offenses in New York City with reductions in
serious violent or property crimes in the city).
170 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF
INVESTIGATION, AN ANALYSIS OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE SUMMONSES, QUALITY-OF-LIFE
MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS, AND FELONY CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY, 2010-2015, at 4 (2016)
[hereinafter OIG-NYPD].
171 The NYPD Inspector General's Report demonstrates an absence of any correlation
between the number of quality- of-life arrests and felony crime rate, which is key empirical
foundation for broken windows policing. See id. at 45; see also J. Phillip Thompson, Broken
Policing: The Origins of the "Broken Windows" Policy, 24 NEW LAB. F., May 2015, at 42, 46
(explaining crime reduction may have been a function of demographic changes, decreased crack
use, increased police hiring, and a more favorable economy). But see BRATTON, BROKEN
WINDOWS IS NOT BROKEN, supra note 154, at 13 (responding to the report of the OIG-NYPD).
172 See, e.g., The Issue, COMMUNITIES UNITED FOR POLICE REFORM, https://www
.changethenypd.org/issue [https://perma.cc/589D-P4UV].
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the stage for demands for decriminalization, such the
#NYCdontprosecute campaign.
173
The successful grassroots challenge to the NYPD's Stop and Frisk
program174  undermined a pillar of NYPD's broken windows
strategy.175 The NYPD's stop and frisk practices were so obviously
racially biased that a federal court inferred that the NYPD operated
with discriminatory intent.176 At its height, the NYPD stopped and
frisked 685,724 individuals in 2011.177 From 2002 to 2015, over
eighty percent of the NYPD's stop targets were innocent of any
wrongdoing.178 At least half were Black, and around thirty percent
were Latinx.179 Although the NYPD justified its practice by claiming
it kept guns off the street, the number of New Yorkers found empty
handed belied this claim.180 In response, three lawsuits filed in 2008,
2010, and 2012, challenged various aspects of the department's top
and frisk policies and practices.18' Eventually, all three cases went
to trial in 2013, putting the department under a type of rigorous
scrutiny to which it was unaccustomed.8 2 The federal court for the
Southern District of New York found the NYPD had engaged in a
pattern and practice of racial profiling and unconstitutional stops.
8 3
Judge Scheindlin appointed an independent monitor to implement
reforms and ordered a remedial process that included community
input in developing additional reforms.
8 4
173 See id.
174 See BRATTON, QUALITY-OF-LIFE POLICING, supra note 145, at 5; Kang, supra note 32,
("Discriminatory stop-and-frisk abuses come directly out of the framework of broken windows
theory that the NYPD has employed for the past two decades. It didn't fall from the sky.").
175 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 70, Council Int. No. 1080 (2013); Floyd v. City of
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
176 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 661 ("In order to establish an equal protection violation
based on an intentionally discriminatory application of a facially neutral policy, plaintiffs 'must
prove that the defendants' actions had a discriminatory effect and were motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.' In this case, plaintiffs' statistical evidence of racial disparities in stops
is sufficient to show a discriminatory effect.").




180 See Stop and Frisk Facts, N.Y. C.L. UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-facts
[https://perma.cc/A8HR-BX22].
181 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556, 622-23; Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d
478, 483, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 408 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
182 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 557; N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, TRUST: BRIDGING THE POLICE
/COMMUNITY DIVIDE 1 (2019), https://wwwl.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/home/POApdflTrust.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZBU8-S3CP].
183 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 561-62; Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
184 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
[Vol. 83.1264
The Sanctuary of Prosecutorial Nullification
The success of the stop and frisk litigation was a testament to the
extensive organizing that occurred in the lead up to the trial.
Beginning in 2012, Communities United for Police Reform (CPR)
formalized and unified decades of disparate organizing around police
brutality and discriminatory policing.18 5 CPR brought together a
"movement of community members, lawyers, researchers and
activists ... from all walks of life and represent many of those most
unfairly targeted by the NYPD" fighting for police reform.186 CPR
organized court packing for the stop and frisk court hearings,
publicizing the discoveries made over the course of the trial.187 The
energetic presence of community activists in the solemn hallways of
federal court communicated the public's hunger for change.1 8 CPR
also supports family members of individuals killed by the NYPD,
seeking accountability in disciplinary proceedings and in federal
court. CPR was instrumental in delivering legislation in New York
City Council that forced changes to the department's patrol guide,
such as requiring officers to explain and document street stops.8 9
Outside of CPR's formal organizing efforts, mass protests erupted
in 2014, after NYPD Officer Daniel Pantaleo killed Eric Garner.190
While arresting Garner for selling a single unstamped cigarette,
Pantaleo choked him, using a maneuver banned by the NYPD. 191
Garner told Pantaleo "I can't breathe" eleven times, as he was being
arrested, to no avail.192 Garner died on the sidewalk in Staten Island
and never made it to the precinct.193 Under the banner of
#BlackLivesMatter, the demonstrations drew attention to the
Department's zero-tolerance approach to broken windows offenses. 194
185 See Sam Levin, Stop-and-Frisk Critics Unite Under One Police Reform Campaign,
VILLAGE VOICE (Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.villagevoice.com/2012/02/24/stop-and-frisk-critics-
unite-under-one-police-reform-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/2G8Z-35YK].
186 Our Campaign, COMMUNITIES UNITED FOR POLICE REFORM, https://www.changethenypd
.org/campaign [https://perma.cc/7XC3-W659].
187 See First Week of Floyd Stop-and-Frisk Trial Concludes, COMMUNITIES UNITED FOR
POLICE REFORM (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.changethenypd.org/news/first-week-floyd-stop-
and-frisk-trial-concludes [https://perma.cc/L2SK-4HZT].
188 See id.
189 See id.; N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, PATROL GUIDE NO. 212-11 (2018).
190 See Jonathan Zhou, Soul-Searching at the NYPD After Eric Garner Death, COMMUNITIES
UNITED FOR POLICE REFORM (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.changethenypd.org/media/soul-
searching-nypd-after-eric-garner-death [ ttps ://perma.cc/ZA2Y-KLJ].
191 See Ashley Southall, N. Y.P.D. Fires Officer in 2014 Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2019, at Al; Zhou, supra note 190.
192 See Ashley Southall, Officer in Garner's Death Was 'Untruthful' to Investigators, Judge
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2019, at A21.
193 See id.
194 See Zhou, supra note 190.
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Community leaders have also fashioned innovative strategies for
resisting the criminalization of poverty. Notably, the Coalition to
End Broken Windows hosts #SwipeitForward events, recruiting
members of the public to stand outside turnstiles at subway stations,
and swipe in passengers who cannot afford the fare.195 The campaign
harnesses mutual aid to protect New Yorkers from the risk of arrest
and detention for fare evasion.196 Riders who possess unlimited fare
Metrocards are instructed to swipe their cards for passengers without
means onto the train, which comes at no cost to the cardholder.
197
The Coalition to End Broken Windows is the author of other public
interventions to bring attention to the needs and concerns of those
heavily policed.198  Its platform underscores the importance of
decriminalization hand in hand with public investment in services
that address community needs for safety and health.199 In a different
vein, but similarly rooted in community action, the Police Reform
Organizing Project (PROP) monitors arraignments for broken
windows offenses, noting the outcomes and racial disparities in who
gets prosecuted and for what.200 PROP publishes its findings20 1 and
for a time was the only independent police monitor sitting in criminal
court.
Parallel with these organizing efforts at the grassroots level, there
has been a robust academic and policy effort dedicated to debunking
the empirical claims underpinning the theory of broken windows.
202
As a result of this multi-pronged approach in the streets and in
195 See Nick Pinto, 'Swipe it Forward'Activists Protest NIYPD Subway Arrests by Giving Out
Free Rides, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/11/03/swipe-
it-forward-activists-protest-nypd-subway-arrests-by-giving-out-free-rides/ [https://perma.cc
IVJK7-KVQX].
19 See Aaron Morrison, With #SwipeItForward, NYC Activists Call Out Unnecessary




198 See id.; Kenrya Rankin, Activists Ticket White Residents to Highlight How Police Target
People of Color, COLORLINES (Oct. 21, 2015, 3:14 PM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles
/activists-ticket-white-residents-highlight-how-police-target-people-color [https://perma.cc
/UZ5D-26G4].
19 Coalition to End Broken Windows, How to End 'Broken Windows' The People's Agenda
(on file with author).
200 See The Mission, POLICE REFORM ORGANIZING PROJECT, http://www.policereform
organizingproject.org/mission [https://perma.cc/2GGC-NAZ8].
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 993-94 (2003); Harcourt & Ludwig,
Broken Windows, supra note 169, at 314-15; Harcourt & Ludwig, Reefer Madness, supra note
169, at 2.
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academic and policy circles, the NYPD recalibrated its efforts and DA
offices made minor changes to their charging policy. 20 3 Misdemeanor
arrests also continue to plunge. And, while public polls suggest many
still support zero tolerance enforcement,20 4 the policing strategy is
also discussed as a civil rights violation. Despite these developments,
the NYPD still promotes the outcomes espoused by the theory, rejects
claims that it fuels racial disparities, and has been accused of skirting
the new reporting requirements mandated by the stop and frisk
settlement.
205
Across New York City, there is a spirit of reform. The depth of the
critique varies by stakeholder as do the proposals for delivering
change. For example, some members of the New York City Council
have supported replacing arrests for quality of life offenses with civil
summonses, which carry fines instead of jail time and convictions and
avoid immigration consequences.206 The Coalition to End Broken
Windows and other community groups opposed this proposal because
it would still result in penalizing the City's poor and communities of
203 See BRATTON, BROKEN WINDOWS IS NOT BROKEN, supra note 154, at 31; Janon Fisher,
Manhattan and Bronx Prosecutors Agree to Drop all Petty Summonses After Request from
Councilman Lancman, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.nydailynews.comlnews
/politics/ny-pol-minor-summons-quality-of-life-offenses-lancman-vance-clark-20190317-story
.html [https://perma.cc/6FDQ-VCNT] ("The district attorneys of Manhattan and the Bronx have
agreed to clear all summonses for petty offenses-so -called quality of life crimes-from their
books after Queens Councilman Rory Lancman urged all city prosecutors abandon prosecuting
'broken windows' offenses."). The number civil summonses, which replaced arrests for some
criminal offenses after 2016 legislation, have also declined in the past two years: "Since the
passage of CJRA and the full implementation of its provisions in June 2017, the number of
criminal summonses issued in New York for such offenses has dropped 94.5%-from 134,902
in 2016 to 7,425 in 2018." Fisher, supra note 203. Summonses for transit offenses have also
declined, as have arrests for theft of services, from 18,040 in 2017 to 5,905 in 2018. See
Jeanmarie Evelly, Does Less Policing - More Fare Beating on New York City Subways?, CITY
LIMITS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://citylimits.org/2019/01/30/does-less-policing-more-fare-beating-
on-new-york-city-subways/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ4B-3U8W].
204 See Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. Poll, New York City Voters Want Their Broken
Windows Fixed, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; 'No Excuse' for Garner Death, Voters Say
Almost 3-1 (Aug. 27, 2014), https://cbsnewyork.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/quinnipiac.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4NGV-G5JX] ("Police issuing summonses and making arrests for low-level
offenses improves the quality of life in a neighborhood, 56 percent of New York City voters say,
while 35 percent say these police actions add to tensions in a neighborhood, according to a
Quinnipiac University poll released today. Police action improves the quality of life, 49 percent
of black voters say.").
205 See BRATrrON, BROKEN WINDOWS IS NOT BROKEN, supra note 154, at 1, 5; Jenn Rolnick
Borchetta et al., Don't Wreck Stop-and-Frisk Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2018, at A27.
206 See Max Rivlin-Nadler, Trump's Deportation Machine Is in High Gear, but Who in NYC
Can Stop It?, VILLAGE VOICE (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.villagevoice.com/2017
/02/22/trumps-deportation-machine-is-in-high-gear-but-who-in-nyc-can-stop-it/ [https://perma
.cc/8RDP-MR5W].
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color, saddling them with debts they could not afford to repay.20 7 The
Manhattan and Brooklyn DAs expanded pre-charge diversion
programs for some category of low-level offenses: in exchange for
dropping charges, the DA requires individuals arrested for criminal
possession of a controlled substance to participate in a drug
counseling session.20 A grassroots coalition of medical professionals
and drug users, End Overdose NY, has instead asked DAs to decline
charges for possession of controlled substance and paraphernalia,
and support the creation of safe injection sites.209 End Overdose NY
declares unequivocally, "[i]t is inappropriate for courts to impose or
interfere with medical decisions.' '210  Similarly, the Lippman
Commission, under the direction of the former chief judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, recommended the permanent closure of New
York City's Rikers Island jail, and its replacement with four modern
jails located inside of neighborhoods, attributing the cruelty of
conditions in the city's notorious jail to lethal combination of
geography, architecture, and regulatory failure.211 The No New Jails
campaign formed in opposition, rejected the creation of any new
jails.212 It proposes that funds allocated for construction pay for
207 See Josmar Trujillo, Broken Windows Breaks the Bank, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2017,
12:00 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/broken-windows-breaks-the b 14487326 [https://
perma.ccV3KD-XB7D]; Emma Whitford, NYPD Claims New Yorkers Won't Be Deported for
Turnstile Jumping, GOTHAMIST (Feb. 25, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://gothamist.com/2017/02/25
/nypd-turnstilejumping-deportation.php [https://perma.cc/6XZ7-4T5Z].
208 See Press Release, Brooklyn Dist. Attorney's Office, Brooklyn District Attorney
Announces Project Brooklyn CLEAR to Offer Treatment for Individuals Arrested with Small
Amount of Narcotics (Mar. 6, 2018), http://www.brooklynda.org/2018/03/06lbrooklyn-district-
attorney-announces-projectbrooklyn-clear-to-offer-treatment-for-individuals - rrested-with-
small-amount-of-narcotics/ [https://perma.cc/4X46-CSQS]; Press Release, Manhattan Dist.
Attorney's Office, supra note 34.
209 See Guard Against Failed War on Drugs Approaches, END OVERDOSE N.Y., http://
endoverdoseny.com/action-steps/guard-against] [h tps://perma.cc/9UQQ-8TQJ].
210 Id.
211 See INDEP. COMM'N ON N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE & INCARCERATION REFORM, A MORE
JUST NEW YORK CITY 14 (2017), https://staticl.squarespace.comstatic5b6de47
3 1aeflde914f43628/t/5b96c6f81ae6cf5e9c5f186d/1536607993842/Lippman%2BCommission
%2BReport%2BFINAL%2BSingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CUH-U3J6] ('The Commission has
concluded that shuttering Rikers Island is an essential step toward building a more just New
York City. Refurbishing Rikers is not enough. Our current approach to incarceration is broken
and must be replaced .... The Commission believes that confinement is necessary when
individuals are a threat to others, but that its use should be a last resort."); Corey Johnson &
Jonathan Lippman, We Must Seize Today's Path to Actually Closing Rikers; It May Not Be Here
Tomorrow, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Apr. 23, 2019) http://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/8465-
seizing-path-to-actually-closing-rikers-jails-corey-johnson-lippman [https://perma.cc/7ADC-
RDND].
212 See Noah Goldberg, Who is No New Jails NYC?, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (May 14, 2019),
https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/05/14/no-new-jails-nyc/ [https://perma.cc9THQ-
KWCE].
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"public housing, homeless shelters, public schools, and expanded
mental health services for incarcerated people."213
These disagreements reflect broader ideological and strategic fault
lines in the battle for criminal legal reform, with liberal law reform
efforts preferring policies that "lighten the touch" of the carceral
institutions and abolitionist advocates seeking to shrink their
footprint. Underlying this difference are distinct critiques of policing
and incarceration. Summonses, newer jails, and diversion are liberal
reforms that view carceral institutions as legitimate but in need of
improvement. Abolitionist organizing sees law enforcement as
currently carried out as illegitimate. Change can only occur by
divesting from prisons, police, and prosecutors, and reinvesting in
other institutions. The #NYCdontprosecute campaign entered this
city-wide debate, building on the successes of mobilization and
centering the unique and intersectional concerns of noncitizens.
B. Broken Windows in Court
The campaign built on the new common sense about the harms of
zero tolerance policing but added observations from court to show
what happened once arrests were translated into criminal charges.214
While police officers were responsible for the arrests, prosecutors
continued the process by pressing charges.215 Until recently, the
police reform community overlooked the role of the prosecutor in
legitimizing these arrests, and extracting convictions, surcharges,
fines and days of community service.216 The campaign drew attention
to the prosecutor's role in the City's broken windows strategy.217
At the time of the campaign, and to this day, broken windows
arrests in Manhattan were labeled as "quality-of-life offenses,"
213 See id.
214 See 5 Boro Defs., FAQ, supra note 8.
215 See id.
216 See, e.g., JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION-AND How
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 5-6 (2017) (offering a corrective to the standard narrative, which
attributes mass incarceration to the longer prison sentences, the War on Drugs and private
prisons, and instead demonstrating that prosecutor's increased felony filings was the core
driver); Leon Neyfakh, Top Police and Prosecutors Condemn Mass Incarceration, SLATE (Oct.
23, 2015, 10:25 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/10/police-and-prosecutors-
condemning-mass-incarceration-ignore-their-own-role-in-the-problem.html [https://perma.cc
IP2S4-J9QU]; Eli Hager & Bill Keller, Everything You Think You Know About Mass
Incarceration Is Wrong, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org
/2017/02/09/everything-you-think-you-know-about-mass-incarceration-is-wrong [https://perma
.cc/B6LU-QFUR].
217 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
2019/2020]
Albany Law Review
prosecuted by an eponymous bureau dedicated to such cases.218 In
that bureau, a supervisor strictly controlled the plea offers made
available to resolve such cases.
219
Offers most reliably depend on prior "contacts" or arrests.220 A
dedicated court room staffed not by a judge, but a judicial hearing
officer hears these cases.221 The court room, called the Bench Trial
Part 1 (BTP 1) was created to expedite resolutions of broken windows
offenses.222 Although most cases are class A misdemeanors, which
entitle the accused to a jury trial, if such cases go to trial, prosecutors
reduce the top count to a class B misdemeanor. Trials for B
misdemeanors are bench trials.223 In Manhattan, under the previous
DA, Robert Morgenthau, low-level offenses were regularly dismissed
because Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs) could not bring the
cases to trial on time, exceeding the speedy trial period.224 These
dismissals occurred because such cases made up only a small portion
of a prosecutor's caseload, which inevitably included more serious
offenses.225 As a result, ADAs did not prioritize broken windows
offenses, many of which were eventually dismissed.226 Both a
dedicated unit in the DA's office, and a court room were created to
avoid such dismissals.227 This specialization is significant because it
illustrates the commitment of the Manhattan DA's office
commitment to prosecuting these offenses, while the police force
weathered criticism for the very policing approach responsible for
bringing those charges to the DA's desk.
218 MODELS FOR INNOVATION, supra note 135, at 20.
219 See id.
220 See BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY, at viii (2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffilesl/nij/grants/247227.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TAK-7DZA].
221 See MODELS FOR INNOVATION, supra note 135, at 20.
222 See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF N.Y.C. CRIMINAL COURT, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK ANNUAL REPORT 5, 6 (2014), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/COURTS/nyc
/criminal/cc annlrpt2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC6Q-PHUM]; see also MODELS FOR
INNOVATION, supra note 135, at 6 ("In 2009, the Office's dismissal rate, excluding dismissals
following a six-month period of being arrest-free (an Adjournment in Contemplation of
Dismissal or ACD), was 21%; in 2017, the comparable dismissal rate was 15%. In 2009, 46%
of dismissals involved an ACD; in 2017, 68% of dismissals involved an ACD.").
223 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 340.40(2) (McKinney 2019) ("In any local criminal court a
defendant who has entered a plea of not guilty to an information which charges a misdemeanor
must be accorded a jury trial ... except that in the New York city criminal court the trial...
must be a single judge trial."); KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 169.
224 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1) (McKinney 2019); MODELS FOR INNOVATION, supra
note 135, at 2, 4.
225 See MODELS FOR INNOVATION, supra note 135, at 4.
226 See id.
227 See id. at 4, 20-21.
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Ironically, two of the city's DA offices, Manhattan and Brooklyn,
often positioned themselves as more progressive than the NYPD. 228
Each made minor but symbolic changes to their charging practices of
low-level offenses, signaling some degree of shared awareness of the
problems associated with broken windows policing.229 All five
borough DAs still prosecuted low-level charges, and aggressively so
until recently.2
30
The decreasing arrest numbers in the past five years has meant
prosecutors can give those cases more attention than before.
Attention, however, does not guarantee diligence or judicious
discretion. From a prosecutor's perspective, quality-of-life cases are
228 See Stephanie Clifford & Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Limits When He'll Target
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2014, at A17; Beth Fertig, District Attorneys Take Steps to Relax
Marijuana Enforcement, WNYC NEWS (May 15, 2018), https://www.wnyc.org/story/district-
attorneys-take-steps-soften-marijuana-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/FEQ6-4AK8]; Beth
Fertig & Jenny Ye, Brooklyn's DA's Pledge to Reduce Marijuana Prosecutions Makes Little
Difference, WNYC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/despite-das-change-
marijuana-policy-brooklyn-defendants-still-come-court/ [https://perma.cc/6PTX-BX5A].
229 See Testimony Before City Council Public Safety and Finance Committees: FY18
Preliminary Budget, MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATT'Y's OFF. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www
.manhattanda.org/testimonybeforecity-council-public -safety-and-finance-committees fy18-
preliminary-budget/[https://perma.cc/JC3Z-PBNA].
In addition to prosecuting the most violent offenders, my Office is redoubling our efforts
to reduce the number people charged with low-level offenses prosecuted in Manhattan.
These efforts have culminated in a 27 percent reduction in the number of misdemeanor
and violation cases referred to us by the NYPD alongside a simultaneous reduction in
violent crime. To put this remarkable decline into context, in 2010, my first year as
District Attorney, the NYPD made 92,585 misdemeanor and violation arrests in
Manhattan; last year there were 67,246 arrests. This reduction, which we believe we can
continue driving down, is a result of a number of innovative approaches .... Second, as of
March 2016, my office stopped the practice of prosecuting most low-level, non-violent
violations and infractions in criminal court unless there is a demonstrated public safety
reason to do so. As a result, 11,000 fewer low-level cases have been sent to us from the
NYPD, preventing thousands of people from unnecessarily being arrested, detained and
going before a judge in a criminal courthouse.
Id.; see also Clifford & Goldstein, supra note 228; Fertig & Ye, supra note 228.
230 See MODELS FOR INNOVATION, supra note 135, at 4-5; DARCEL D. CLARK, OFFICE OF THE
BRONX CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2017), https://www.bronxda.nyc.gov
/downloads/pdf/annual-reports/annual report_2017.pdf; Press Release, Brooklyn Dist.
Attorney's Office, Low-Level Marijuana Prosecutions in Brooklyn Plunged by over 91% This
Year as District Attorney's Office Expanded Declination Policy (July 27, 2018), http://www
.brooklynda.org/2018/07/27/low-level-marijuana-prosecutions-in-brooklyn-plunged-by-over-91-
this-year-as-district-attorneys-office-expanded-declination-policy/ [https://perma.ccHJW8-
VCKB]; Ross Barkan, Advocates Say Queens Needs a Progressive DA to Root Out 'Deeply-Rooted
Moral Corruption', GOTHAMIST (Jan. 22, 2019, 11:20 AM), http://gothamist.com2019/01/22
/queens-da race-protest.php [https://perma.cc/PM9T-QH9N]; Erin Durkin, Staten Island DA
Won't Be Joining in on Push to Stop Prosecuting Marijuana Charges, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May
16, 2018, 6:16 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/staten-island-da-won-step-
prosecuting-marijuana-charges-article- 1.3993096 [https://perma.cc/76KD-SLDH].
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hard to distinguish from one another. The only discovery in these
cases are a police officer's paperwork. The descriptions in the police
forms are often boilerplate, nondescript, and frequently unreliable.
231
A police officer, like anyone else can conflate memories of
unremarkable events, like seeing someone smoke marijuana on the
street.232 The police are also under pressure to meet arrest quotas,
which can lead to mistakes, exaggeration, and fabrication.
233
Prosecutors judge the worth of a low-level case according to the
defendant's prior arrests and convictions rather than the conduct
alleged.234 Most cases are resolved not by criminal convictions, but
by subcriminal marks-resolutions that do not technically create or
add to a criminal record.235 As Kohler-Hausmann has argued, these
reduced outcomes serve to manage urban, poor communities of color
rather than adjudicate criminal activity.236 When a prosecutor sees
that the accused has multiple arrests, she may decide not to offer a
plea bargain, requiring a trial or a plea to a misdemeanor, creating
or adding to a criminal record.237 But for the vast majority of those
arrested for broken windows offenses, their cases result in
subcriminal outcomes, without any legal finding of guilt, but that can
still trigger negative immigration consequences for noncitizens.
238
About half of all cases result in some kind of dismissal.
239
Specifically, in criminal court, defendants most commonly resolve
their quality of life cases by accepting an Adjournment in
Contemplation of Dismissal (ACD), under New York Criminal
Procedure Law section 170.56, or a plea to disorderly conduct under
231 See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 24, at 1332.
232 See, e.g., id. at 1338.
233 See Joseph Goldstein, 'Testilying' by Police Persists as Cameras Capture Truth, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2018, at Al.
234 See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 165, 168, 169.
2-5 See id. at 143, 165, 170 ("[T]he marks defendants bear as they enter and traverse
misdemeanorland trigger a series of organizational, professional, and political pressures on
court actors and activate standard responses in the field.").
236 See id. at 4.
237 See id. at 163-71.
228 See id. at 69; 5 Boro Defs., FAQ, supra note 8.
239 See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 68-69 ("[Ihe significant increase in
misdemeanor arrests did not translate into proportionate convictions. The misdemeanor
justice system converted an ever-decreasing share of misdemeanor case filings into criminal
convictions as the total volume of cases increased. In 1985, approximately 44 percent of
misdemeanor arrests terminated in misdemeanor criminal convictions, while in 1993 the
percentage was 33 percent, and it has not exceeded 20 percent since 2010."). Dismissals in
Kohler-Hausmann's study includes a prosecutor's decision to decline to prosecute. See id. at
69.
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New York Penal Law section 240.20.240 Days of community service,
a fine, or a program-the term used for a class or counseling
session-will often accompany an ACD or disorderly conduct plea.
241
An ACD entails having the case adjourned for a period of time,
most often a year or six months.242 If the accused incurs no new
arrest, or in the court's vernacular, if the accused "stay[s] out of
trouble," for that period of time, the case is dismissed and sealed.243
If there were no conditions attached to the ACD, the accused person
need not appear in court for the dismissal.244 During that time, the
case appears as an open case.245 For noncitizens, an ACD makes the
person visible to federal immigration authorities until the case is
dismissed and sealed.246 ACDs "represent] roughly 23 to 30 percent
of all misdemeanor arrest dispositions in recent years.247
Disorderly conduct is not a misdemeanor under New York State
law, but a violation that carries a maximum of fifteen days in jail
and/or $250 in fines.248 There is also a mandatory court surcharge of
$120.249 After a year, the underlying arrest record is sealed, and only
the mark of a disorderly conduct violation is apparent.250
For noncitizens, however, although the offense is not a crime under
state law, disorderly conduct can be grounds for denial of an
immigration benefit that is awarded on the basis of discretion.251
With the fifteen-day-maximum jail time, under DACA guidelines,
disorderly conduct can count as a misdemeanor under federal law.252
240 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.56 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20
(McKinney 2019); KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 147, 148, 153.
2A' See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 148.
242 See id. at 147.
23 See id. at 148.
244 See id.
245 See id.
246 See id. at 150.
247 Id. at 147.
248 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.15(4), 80.05(4), 240.20(4) (McKinney 2019).
249 See PENAL § 60.35(1)(a)(iii).
250 See KoHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 158.
251 See Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Immigration Jointly with the
Committee on Education and Committee on Public Safety, at 206-07 (Apr. 26, 2017) (statement
of Hasan Shafaqullah, Deputy Attorney, Immigration Law Unit, Legal Aid Society), https://
legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3028942&GUID=1058179C- 1264-44A8-
A9DO-D3B4A3C66B59 [https://perma.cc/8W7V-XANE].
252 See PENAL § 70.15; Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Immigration Jointly
with the Committee on Education and Committee on Public Safety, supra note 251, at 206-07;
see also Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CUSTOMS & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov




Noncitizens charged with broken windows offenses, not only are
targets of a local policing strategy designed to manage an urban
underclass, but face a heightened risk of removal.
253
IV. No CLEAR VICTORY
The results of the campaign were less important than the legal and
policy questions raised by the demands it made and mechanism for
pressure it employed. As abolitionist organizer Miriame Kaba
explains, "Organizing is mostly about defeats. Often when we engage
in a campaign, we lose but any organizer worth their salt knows that
it's much more complex than a simple win-lose calculus."254 As Amna
Akbar writes, "Radical social movements are important not simply
for what changes they effectuate in law, but in what they imagine
and where they fail."
255
The campaign lasted three months, until the end of April 2017.256
No DA's office acknowledged the existence of the campaign, and most
broken windows offenses were still prosecuted after the campaign
concluded. While the campaign did not achieve a clear victory, it was
also not failure. Receptionists in DAs' offices in three boroughs grew
so accustomed to public calls that they often interrupted callers mid
script, telling them they knew why they were calling, and promising
to register their concern.25 7 In the absence of any official recognition
or inside knowledge, it is difficult to assess the campaign's impact.
In the months that followed, the Manhattan and Brooklyn DA offices
announced some shifts in their practices.
258
In September 2017, the Manhattan DA promised to no longer
prosecute individuals for theft of services, or the A misdemeanor
charge associated with fare evasion.259 In 2018, the office followed
253 See Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Immigration Jointly with the
Committee on Education and Committee on Public Safety, supra note 251, at 206-07.
254 A Love Letter to the #NoCopAcademy Organizers from Those of Us on the Freedom
Side..., PRISON CULTURE (Mar. 13, 2019), http://www.usprisonculture.comblog/2019/03/13/a-
love-letter-to-the-nocopacademy-organizersfrom-those f-us-on-thefreedom -side/ [https://
perma.cc/XCT5-9MQE] [hereinafter Prison Culture].
255 Akbar, supra note 20, at 476.
2516 See Press Release, Manhattan Dist. Attorney's Office, supra note 34; 5 Boro Defs., Weekly
Update #5, supra note 112.
257 See Google Survey (on file with author).
258 See Press Release, Manhattan Dist. Attorney's Office, supra note 34; Bankoff, supra note
34.
259 Press Release, Manhattan Dist. Attorney's Office, supra note 34 ("Beginning in
September 2017, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office will no longer prosecute the
overwhelming majority of individuals charged with Theft of Services for subway-related
offenses, unless there is a demonstrated public safety reason to do so.").
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with promises to stop prosecuting unlicensed general vending,
possession of marijuana in open view, and unlicensed operation of a
motor vehicle in some circumstances.260 These promises have not
been uniformly kept.
261
On the campaign trail in the summer of 2017, Acting DA Eric
Gonzalez of Brooklyn vowed to end some low-level prosecutions, but
did not make specific commitments.262 DA Gonzalez inherited an
office policy not to prosecute marijuana charges from his late
predecessor-a policy, however, that was not consistently applied.
26 3
Acting DA Gonzalez also vowed to expand pre-charge diversion
programs.
264
Both the Manhattan and Brooklyn DAs' offices promised to hire in-
house immigration counsel to "minimiz[e] collateral immigration
consequences of criminal convictions, particularly for misdemeanor
and other low-level offenses ... in an effort to avoid disproportionate
collateral consequences, such as deportation, while maintaining
public safety."265 Gonzalez clarified his decision:
I want to emphasize that our Office is not seeking to frustrate
the federal government's function of protecting our country by
removing non-citizens whose illegal acts have caused real
harm and endangered others. Rather, our goal is to enhance
public safety and fairness in the criminal justice system and
this policy complements, but does not compromise, this goal.
We will not stop prosecuting crimes, but we are determined to
260 See MODELS FOR INNOVATION, supra note 135, at 8, 9, 11.
261 See Jake Offenhartz, Vance's DAs Won't Stop Throwing the Book at Petty Crime, VILLAGE
VOICE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.villagevoice.com/2018/02/08/vances-das-wont-stop-throwing-
the-book-at-petty-crime/ [https://perma.cc/MG45-MGTZ].
262 See James C. McKinley Jr., For Manhattan Fare-Beaters, a One-Way Ticket to Court May
Be Gone Soon, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2017, at A18 ("Brooklyn's acting district attorney, Eric
Gonzalez, also applauded Mr. Vance for finding a way to keep theft of services cases out of
criminal court. 'A similar policy will be implemented in Brooklyn,' he said. The Queens District
attorney, Richard A. Brown, said he would closely monitor Manhattan's initiative.").
263 See Fertig & Ye, supra note 228.
264 See Rob Abruzzese, Acting DA Eric Gonzalez Receives Endorsement of Local Activists,
BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (July 25, 2017), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2017/07/25/acting-
da-eric-gonzalez-receives-endorsement-of-local-activists/ [https://perma.cc/72AZ-K4XU].
265 Press Release, Brooklyn Dist. Attorney's Office, Acting Brooklyn District Attorney Eric
Gonzalez Announces New Policy Regarding Handling of Cases Against Non-Citizen Defendants
(Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.brooklynda.org/2017/04/24/acting-brooklyn-district-attorney-eric-
gonzalez-announces-new-policy-regarding-handling-of-cases-against-non-citizen-defendants/




see that case outcomes are proportionate to the offense as well
as fair and just for everyone.
266
Similarly, DA Cyrus Vance of Manhattan created a Collateral
Consequences Counsel position in his office.
26 7
In Staten Island, the Bronx, and Queens, the borough DAs did not
make any promises to change their charging practices.
V. LESSONS FROM THE CAMPAIGN
The campaign, although bold in its demands, was modestly
organized. Organizers responded spontaneously to the promulgation
of an EO, which carried the threat of mass expulsion.268 Public
defenders translated the fear they felt on behalf of their clients into
a proposal for concrete legal change.269 The campaign was sustained
solely by volunteer hours in between court appearances, jail visits,
and the daily rhythms of public defense work. Without the benefit of
a strategic plan, some of broader institutional dynamics and political
questions implicated by the campaign's demands were never
explicitly discussed.
On reflection, the campaign is a case study in implementing
expanded sanctuary protections. First, prosecutorial nullification of
broken windows offenses can serve as an important first step
prosecutors can take to recognize and mitigate against the
consolidation of the crimmigration system. As scholars have
observed, the growth of a more punitive and securitized immigration
enforcement regime has historically relied on the local expansion of
carceral technologies, specifically order maintenance policing.
270
Decriminalization thus protects noncitizens from one of the core
drivers of removal.
Nullification of low-level crimes is a flexible strategy that offers
jurisdictions the chance to test out decriminalization, relying on the
266 Id.
267 See MODELS FOR INNOVATION, supra note 135, at 17.
268 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 25, 2017).
269 See Prison Culture, supra note 254.
270 See, e.g., C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernindez, Deconstructing Crimmigration, 52 U.C.
DAVIS 197, 223 (2018) ("For all indignity and physical maltreatment that securitization and
imprisonment policies inflict on migrants, crimmigration law's adverse impact extends to a
more intangible forum .... Crimmigration law's foundation in criminal law norms means that
it is perhaps not surprising that the local governments that operate most of the law
enforcement agencies in the United States are integral components of contemporary policing of
migration.").
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plenary discretion afforded to prosecutors.271 In the short term,
before there is legislative reform, however, nullification could
arguably exacerbate the unchecked discretion of prosecutors. That
prosecutors can lawfully nullify charges is itself a reflection of their
unfettered power. To exploit their discretion in an effort to shrink
the ambit of criminalization may be counterproductive. To avoid this
pitfall, advocates can follow their campaign for nullification with
successive campaigns for legislative decriminalization, a reduction in
the DAs' budgets, and reparations for those harmed by broken
windows prosecutions. Furthermore, multiple and reinforcing layers
of democratic support may help assuage concerns of prosecutorial
bias and overreach. Communities most affected by criminalization
endorsed the #NYCdontprosecute campaign. Their support helped to
legitimize the campaign's demand for bold prosecutorial action. As a
matter of process, the campaign also planted the seeds for a new form
of public engagement with DAs, outside of elections that are rarely
contested or the site for substantive engagement on law and justice.
A. The Merits of Decriminalization
At the time of the campaign, decriminalization was not a
prominent feature of sanctuary policy platforms. Scholars have
failed to consider such policies as sanctuary city policies.272 More
recently, community organizations led by directly impacted
individuals, such as the Black Youth Project 100 (BYP100), Mijente,
and the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI) have advocated
to expand the parameters of sanctuary city policies. Specifically,
their platforms aim to go beyond shielding noncitizens, and towards
actively "dismantl[ing] the current policing apparatus that acts as a
funnel to mass incarceration and the deportation machine.273
As Tania Unzueta, an activist with Mijente, a group that provides
a hub for Latinx organizing on issues relating to immigrant justice
and policing, explains,
[L]imiting whether police actively investigate someone's
immigration status, or if immigration authorities have access
to jails to do the same, represents the minimum today .... If
271 See Maria A. Fufidio, Note, "You May Say I'm a Dreamer, But I'm Not the Only One"
Categorical Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Consequences for US Immigration Law, 36
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 976, 985 (2013).
272 See Lasch et al., supra note 1, at 1708-10.
273 UNZUETA, supra note 17, at 1; accord RITCHIE & MORRIS, supra note 17, at 3.
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sanctuary is a pledge to make our cities truly safe for their
residents than there are more agencies to address than simply
ICE and more people in need of refuge than solely
undocumented Immigrants .... Sanctuary as a concept must
evolve and be expanded. It can be a call that unites broad
swaths of institutions and civil society if it is based in the
belief that collective protection should extend to all
communities facing criminalization and persecution and
defend against all the agencies that threaten us.
274
The Expanded Sanctuary City and Freedom City campaigns,
amongst others, "call for an end to all policing and immigration
enforcement practices that target Black and Brown communities,
immigrant and U.S. born."275  Liberal public policy and public
defender organizations have echoed these community calls.276 The
Immigrant Legal Resource Center endorses a broad vision for
sanctuary policies: A "[s]anctuary is fundamentally about public
safety: the need for everyone in the community to feel safe.
277
Similarly, the Fair Punishment Project makes the following
recommendation:
Local officials-mayors, city council members, county
commissioners, prosecutors, and the police-now have a
critical opportunity to thwart his plans and acknowledge the
inextricable link between the deportation pipeline and the
criminal justice system, and to finally reform their criminal
justice systems. It is already smart policy to stop sending
people to jail en masse; localities' punitive policies
disproportionately send people of color, including immigrants,
to languish in jail or prison. But to make good on their
274 UNZUETA, supra note 17, at 1, 4-5.
275 RITCHIE & MORRIS, supra note 17, at i.
276 See ROSE CAHN, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., MODEL PROSECUTOR POLICIES &
PRACTICES ON IMMIGRATION ISSUES (2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources
/model prosec pol_prac immig_issues-20181121.pdf [https://perma.cc/U57U-HEMG]; FAIR
PUNISHMENT PROJECT ET AL., THE PROMISE OF SANCTUARY CITIES AND THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORMS IN AN ERA OF MASS DEPORTATION 3 (2017), http://fairpunishment.org/wp-
contentluploads/2017/04/FPP-Sanctuary-Cities-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9TG-
ZVMS]; LENA GRABER ET AL., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., LOCAL OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING
IMMIGRANTS: A COLLECTION OF CITY & COUNTY POLICIES TO PROTECT IMMIGRANTS FROM
DISCRIMINATION AND DEPORTATION (2016), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources
/local options-final.pdf [https://perma.ccUAB9-6Z8J]; GRABER & MARQUEZ, SEARCHING FOR
SANCTUARY, supra note 59, at 24; Shakeer Rahman & Robin Steinberg, Sanctuary Cities in
Name Only, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2017, at A27.
277 See GRABER & MARQUEZ, SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY, supra note 59, at 23.
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laudable sanctuary goals, local officials must heed the advice
of criminal justice reformers, immigration advocates, and
their communities, and institute sweeping change.
278
A centerpiece of the Expanded Sanctuary City and Freedom City
platforms is decriminalization of low-level offenses or, in the
alternative, deprioritizing low-level arrests.
279
The Expanded Sanctuary City and Freedom City movements
represent a paradigm shift in the conversation about sanctuary city
protections. Rather than address a jurisdiction's external orientation
to the federal government, these platforms encourage a re-
examination of the internal landscape of criminalization: who gets
arrested, prosecuted, marked, and incarcerated, and for what.
280
Similarly, the #NYCdontprosecute campaign tried to change internal
landscape of the state criminal legal system.2 1 Decriminalization,
however, can take a range of different forms. In this emerging
paradigm, the role of prosecutors in decriminalization remains
under-theorized and underappreciated with a notable exception.
282
What follows is an attempt to examine the merits of achieving
decriminalization through prosecutorial nullification of broken
windows offenses, using both a traditional liberal law reform
framework and one rooted in an abolitionist ethic. This analysis
proceeds in two parts-first, I examine the significance of broken
windows prosecutions for noncitizens, and second, the rewards of
using prosecutorial nullification as a mechanism to achieve
decriminalization.
1. Broken Windows Offenses and Removals
Since the 1980s, the immigration system has relied heavily on state
law enforcement to identify targets for removal. Gradually, those
targeted included individuals with convictions for misdemeanor
offenses.28 3 In 1986, approximately two thousand people were
deported "for criminal and narcotics violations," which accounted for
278 FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 276, at 3.
279 See id. at 4.
280 See RITCHIE & MORRIS, supra note 17, at i-ii, 4, 6 (explaining that Expanded Sanctuary
and Freedom City campaigns focus on protecting immigrant communities from racial profiling,
discriminatory and abusive policing, and targeted criminalization).
281 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
282 Cf. RITCHIE & MORRIS, supra note 17, at 16 (suggesting as an alternative to
decriminalization, prosecutors should deprioritize and refuse to prosecute minor offenses).
283 See Ani Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior
Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1156 (2008).
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4 percent of the total number of people removed that year.28 4 Two
years later, that percentage increased to 23.1%.25 By 1996, criminal
convictions triggered more than half of all removals.286 Legislative
changes complemented this more punitive turn in enforcement. In
the 1990s, Congress extended the categories of convictions that would
lead to removal to include minor offenses.
287
As federal immigration law lowered the threshold for removal by
making low-level offenses grounds for adverse action, local police
departments in cities like New York also ramped up their
enforcement of those very offenses.288 In New York City from 1988 to
1994, felony arrests exceeded misdemeanor arrests by a small
margin.28 9 After 1994, misdemeanor arrests increased relative to
felony arrests by at least a factor of two. 290 This trend persisted in
New York City and was replicated throughout the country.291 In a
survey of thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, there were
9.5 million misdemeanor criminal cases, as compared to 2.4 million
felony cases.292 To this day, misdemeanors, and broken windows
offenses specifically, remain the most frequent reason for contact
with criminal court.293 Federal immigration authorities relied on and
encouraged aggressive state and local policing to locate suspected
undocumented immigrants, while avoiding Tenth Amendment
prohibitions against commandeering.
294
While there are insufficient data to establish whether convictions
and arrests for broken windows offenses are a leading cause for
removal, low-level policing and immigration enforcement target the
284 Herndndez, supra note 43, at 1470.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 See Cade, supra note 8, at 1758.
288 See Bernard E. Harcout, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 301-02, 339-40 (1998).
289 KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 25.
290 Id. at 41 fig.1.3.
291 See id. at 2.
292 Jessica A. Roth, The Culture of Misdemeanor Courts, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 215 n.4
(2017).
293 See, e.g., LISA LINDSAY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF N.Y.C. CRIMINAL COURT,
CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 9, 25-26 (Justin Barry ed.,
2018), https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal/2017-Annual-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LQ9B-TT6M].
294 See, e.g., Joan Friedland, How ICE Uses Databases and Information-Sharing to Deport
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same demographics.295 Black and Latinx individuals are the most
frequent targets of broken windows policing in New York City.2 9 6 "In
2015, 46 percent of misdemeanor arrests were of Black individuals,
35 percent of Hispanic individuals, 13 percent of White individuals,
and 5 percent of other racial or ethnic individuals.'" 297
Unsurprisingly, Black and Latinx are also more likely to face adverse
decisions in their immigration proceedings. 'More than one out of
every five noncitizens facing deportation on criminal grounds before
the Executive Office for Immigration Review is Black."298  "Black
immigrants are more likely to be detained for criminal convictions
than the immigrant population overall."2 99 Latinx are more likely
than their White counterparts to be targets for low-level policing, and
they make up over 90 percent of those deported.3 0  "[W]hile
individuals from.., four Latin American countries make up 72.6
percent of the US unauthorized (im)migrant population in 2012, they
constituted more than 95 percent of removals in 2013."301
Alina Das argues this demographic overlap is not a coincidence, but
consistent with a century long history of racially motivated
immigration enforcement.30 2 Although a criminal record is facially
neutral criterion for adjudicating a person's right to remain, Das's
295 See Howell, supra note 139, at 291-92.
296 See id. at 291.
297 KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 51 (referencing data from the Department of
Criminal Justice Statistics); see also Howell, supra note 139, at 291 ("The data indicate that
about 86% of people arrested for misdemeanors in New York City in the years 2000-2005 were
nonwhite. About 48-50% were reported to be black and another 32-34% Hispanic. The 2001
census estimates that blacks and Latinos make up 27.09% and 27.80% of New Yorkers,
respectively."). In the context of stop and frisk, Blacks and Hispanics relative to Whites have
significantly higher stops per crime ratios at all levels of reported crime. See PETER L. ZIMROTH,
NYPD MONITOR, MONITOR'S FIFTH REPORT-ANALYSIS OF NYPD STOPS, 2013-2015, at 2 (2017).
298 Id. at 5. It is also worth noting that black immigrants are less likely to be in the U.S.
unlawfully as compared to immigrants from other regions and countries. According to a 2013
census, there were "575,000 Black immigrants were living in the U.S. without authorization in
2013, according to the Pew Research Center study, making up 16% of all Black immigrations
population." Id. pt. I, at 14. Despite their overrepresentation in removal proceedings, "[t]he
percentage of Black immigrants whose case was terminated (24%) was 10 points higher than
the percentage of termination among all people in removal proceedings in 2015." Id. at 16.
299 Id. pt. II, at 5.
3oo See MEXICAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND ET AL., DETENTION, DEPORTATION, AND
DEVASTATION: THE DISPROPORTIONATE EFFECT OF DEPORTATIONS ON THE LATINO COMMUNITY
2 (2014), https://www.maldef.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DeportationBriefMALDEF-
NHLA-NDLON.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC7P-PVNY].
301 See MARTHA ESCOBAR, CAPTIVITY BEYOND PRISONS: CRIMINALIZATION OF LATINA
(IM)MIGRANTS 52 (2016).
302 See Alina Das, Inclusive Immigrant Justice: Racial Animus and the Origins of Crime-
Based Deportation, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 171, 173-74 (2018).
2019/2020]
Albany Law Review
review of the historical record suggests the use of criminal convictions
has disguised an immigration policy inflected with racial bias.30 3
Demographic overlap aside, recent data from ICE confirm that
both criminal convictions and pending criminal charges account for
at least half of deportations.30 4 These criminal contacts include low-
level offenses, including drug possession and traffic violations.305 ICE
apprehended over 138,000 people in 2018 because of criminal
conviction or pending charges.306 Almost 33,000 were apprehended
because of pending criminal charges.30 7 In 2017, over 144,000
individuals were deported because of a criminal conviction or pending
charge.308 Selling marijuana and larceny were amongst the top ten
offenses that triggered removal.30 9 The 1700% increase in courthouse
arrests since 2016 underscores the risk of detection posed by a mere
accusation.31 0 Twenty-eight percent of individuals apprehended by
ICE in courthouses did not have a criminal record, and were in court
for a minor offense, often a traffic offense.
311
How are these deportation outcomes produced? As explained in
Section IV.B, many cases are not resolved by misdemeanor
convictions but by ACDs or disorderly conduct pleas, which are
subcriminal. These can alert immigration to contact with local law
enforcement and detract from the strength of a non-citizen's
application for an immigration benefit or for relief from removal.
When it comes to convictions, in New York State, until April 2019,
the maximum sentence for misdemeanors was 365 days, which
"frequently trigger[ed] certain -removal grounds, render[ed]
individuals ineligible for certain forms of relief from removal, or even
303 See id.
304 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF'T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOvAL OPERATIONS REPORT 3 fig.2, 6 fig.4 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/aboutoffices
/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CQ2-G4D3].
305 See id. at 4 tbl.1.
306 Id. at 2.
307 Id. at 3 fig.2.
308 Id. at 3 fig.2, 11 fig.11.
309 See Matt Sedensky, Trump's Immigrant Roundups Increasingly Net Noncriminals, AP
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://apnews.coml8969468fb8b2485a87fflff448397ba0 [https://perma
.cc/GTR6-VQRM].
310 See IMMIGRANT DE. PROJECT, THE COURTHOUSE TRAP: HOW ICE OPERATIONS IMPACTED
NEW YORK'S COURTS IN 2018, at 3 (2019); see also IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT & CTR. FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, ICEWATCH: ICE RAIDS TACTICS MAP 5 (2018) ("Under Trump, ICE
has identified courthouses as a preferred site to arrest non-citizens. IDP documented a 1200%
increase in ICE courthouse arrests from 2016 to 2017.").
311 See Press Release, Immigrant Def. Project, IDP Unveils New Statistics & Trends
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subject[ed] them to mandatory detention.312 Convictions for theft,
controlled substances, and marijuana qualify as crimes involving
moral turpitude under federal law, that trigger removal.313
These data suggest an overlap between order maintenance policing
and civil immigration enforcement. Without more information about
the breakdown of types of convictions and charges that lead to
removal, the extent to which order maintenance policing and
prosecution contribute to civil immigration enforcement remains
unknown. We know that convictions for low-level offenses are
responsible for at least some removals.3 14
2. Limitations of Current Protections
There are three main ways noncitizens in New York who are
prosecuted for low-level offenses can be shielded from the risk of
removal: (1) limits on information sharing imposed on some law
enforcement agencies, (2) harm-reducing pleas, and (3) altering state
penal codes to avoid statutory overlap with federal grounds for
removal, inadmissibility, or ineligibility for relief or benefits.315 I
address the benefits and limitations of each.
a. Limits on information sharing
As discussed in Part I, New York City's sanctuary laws do not
regulate all law enforcement agencies operating in the five boroughs.
They also do not target all the points of potential contact with federal
immigration authorities. The detection protections have exceptions
for individuals with certain felony convictions, or purported terrorist
312 IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, "ONE DAY TO PROTECT NEW YORKERS" LEGISLATION PRACTICE
ADVISORY (Apr. 29, 2019) [hereinafter IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, "ONE DAY TO PROTECT NEW
YORKERS"] (citations omitted), https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads
/One-Day-to-Protect-New-Yorkers-364.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU4K-P3JG]; see also 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1226(c)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii), 1229(b)(1)(C) (2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney
2019).
313 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, § N.11 BURGLARY,
THEFT, AND FRAUD 227 (Jan. 2019) https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/n.11-
buglary-theft fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SXK-SY3J]; IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER,
§ N.8 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 2, 3 (2013), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources
/chart-note_08-controlled substances.pdf [https://perma.ccDF6Y-RL83].
314 See Cade, supra note 8, at 1754.
316 See N.Y.C. BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE CRIMINAL COURTS COMMITTEE
THE CRIMINAL COURT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW
COMMITTEE 2 (2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2019490-OneDay
ProtectNYersBudget.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6CE-B2MV]; Cade, supra note 8, at 1798-99;
Lasch et al., supra note 1, at 1745-46.
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or gang affiliations.3 1 6 One worthwhile reform may include closing
those gaps in coverage, particularly those relating to DA conduct.
317
While preventing information sharing between local and federal law
enforcement can thwart detection, it does not prevent individuals
from being targets for removal in the first instance.318 For example,
these protections do not address whether noncitizens caught with
marijuana should face the risk of adverse immigration consequences.
That normative decision largely falls to immigration law and whether
police, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys are mindful of
collateral consequences in state court.
319
b. Harm-reducing pleas
Another category of reform targets the role that defense attorneys
can play to mitigate the immigration risks for their noncitizen clients
facing criminal prosecution. For example, the Immigrant Legal
Resource Center proposes that local jurisdictions reinforce defense
attorneys' "constitutional duty under the Sixth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution to affirmatively and competently advise of the
immigration consequences of criminal offenses."320 Reforms in this
vein would increase funding to defense organizations to hire more
staff, including immigration specialists. In a related vein, the
Brooklyn and Manhattan DAs both publicly announced their
intention to hire immigration specialists to advise their staffs on the
immigration consequences of dispositions in criminal court.
321
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,
defense attorneys have an obligation to advise their non-citizen
clients of the immigration consequences of a plea.322 Prosecutors and
defense attorneys are in the habit of engaging in discussions that
weigh immigration consequences against criminal conduct alleged,
and debate whether the collateral consequences are proportionate to
316 See Press Release, Office of the Mayor, supra note 73 ("City agencies, including the NYPD,
will continue to cooperate with federal law enforcement agencies in certain circumstances,
including as part of inter-governmental criminal task forces focusing on topics such as gangs,
human trafficking, and terrorism, and by sharing information about individuals in the City's
criminal custody who have been convicted of one of approximately 170 qualifying violent or serious
felonies under the City's existing laws on immigration detainer requests.').
317 See Brown, supra note 57.
318 See, e.g., Lasch et al., supra note 1, at 1724-25.
319 See Jordan Cunnings, Comment, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens:
Uncounseled Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510, 525-26 (2015).
320 GRABER ET AL., supra note 276.
321 See MODELS FOR INNOVATION, supra note 135, at 17; Press Release, Brooklyn Dist.
Attorney, Non-Citizen Defendants, supra note 265.
322 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
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the conduct at issue.3 23 But an accurate understanding of the
consequences does not guarantee better outcomes for the defendant.
While the risks of adverse immigration consequences can be
mitigated most successfully for lower level offenses, where both sides
may agree that removal is a disproportionate consequence, it is far
more difficult to eliminate the immigration risks for a crime the
prosecutor considers to be serious or for a person with previous
felonies or convictions for violent crime.
Even with a diligent attorney who carries out their Padilla
obligations, time pressure, unequal leverage, and impediments to
getting discovery "frustrate the ability to bargain for immigration-
safe dispositions.'" 324 These very limitations motivated the organizers
to launch the campaign, as discussed in Part II. There are also
pressures to resolve misdemeanor cases at the first appearance,
which leaves for no time to investigate collateral consequences for
individuals whose immigration status is murky or complicated.
Forty percent of cases are settled at arraignments in the five
boroughs.325 
I
The prosecutors staffing arraignments, in particular, are the least
experienced and newest hires in a DA's office,326 and therefore May
be prone to faithfully follow guidelines from supervisors about what
plea bargains to strike. This means that the defense may not be able
to prevail upon the prosecutor to offer a better plea at that first
appearance. More immigration specialists would not address the
pressure to plea and the inequality of arms in the courtroom.
Negotiations for an immigration-safe plea, particularly for low-
level offenses, are inherently imbalanced. An accused is likely to plea
to avoid the collateral costs of fighting the cases-missed days at
work, civil immigration, or employment consequences of a conviction,
obviated by a sub-criminal outcome. Jail is rarely imposed in these
cases. But the bargain is anything but fair. The prosecutors are
rarely alleging a moral trespass. Even theft charges are crimes of
321 See Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 954
n.1 (2018); Davorin J. Odrcic, Plea Bargaining for Noncitizen Clients: What Defense Attorneys
Should Know, ST. B. WIS. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications
/InsideTrackPages/Article.aspx?Volume=7&Issue=20&ArticleID=24398 [https://perma.cc
/W5TU-JDQQ].
324 See Cade, supra note 8, at 1776.
321 See LINDSAY, supra note 293, at 28.
326 See, e.g., Career Opportunities, Queens Dist. Attorney, http://www.queensda.org
/Career Opportunities/adacareer.html [https://perma.cc/GTF5-S9R6] (noting that the newest
ADAs are assigned to intake).
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poverty.32 7 The case resolution reached is a tax for being considered
a public nuisance. The risk of removal is so severe that noncitizens
are likely to do anything to avoid that risk stripping them of any
leverage.3
28
In practical terms, empowering the defense would only address
risks that arise at and after the moment of arraignment, when the
right to counsel attaches. Defense centered reforms could not
ameliorate the risks presented by the mere charging of a crime that
attracts ICE's attention after the 2017 EO.
Actions taken to empower the defense also cannot control for the
shifting landscape of federal immigration enforcement. As Jason
Cade has observed, "'[]mmigration-safe' pleas are something of a
moving target because Congress can make immigration
consequences retroactive.
'"3 29
Most significantly, more funding to the defense would not address
the underlying sociological reality of these charges: they reflect the
intense concentration of policing and prosecution resources on Black
and Latinx New Yorkers.330 Once in court, defense attorneys have
limited tools to challenge the concentration of police resources in
those communities or to attack legislative choices that determine
outcomes in court. Although relevant, these arguments about
institutional choices and systemic bias have limited purchase in the
scope of direct representation.
c. Eliminating statutory overlap
Altering statutory definitions of crimes and corresponding
punishments in state penal codes offer another path to insulate
noncitizens at risk of removal from federal detection. After lobbying
efforts by The One Day to Protect New Yorkers campaign, legislators
reduced the maximum penalty for class A misdemeanors in New York
State from 365 to 364 days.331 "Previously, the one-year potential
sentence associated with some misdemeanors in New York meant
that convictions would frequently trigger certain removal
327 See Rosa Goldensohn, New York 's Most Desperate Caught Up in 'Crimes of Poverty; CITY
(Oct. 14, 2019), https://thecity.nyc/2019/10/new-yorks-most-desperate-caught-up-in-crimes-of-
poverty.html [https://perma.cc/E2WZ-WV5K ]; see also Cade, supra note 8, at 1802, 1804 ("As
discussed above, poverty and detention cut noncitizens off from support networks, potential
witnesses, and income that may be critical to their legal defense and family's survival.").
328 See, e.g., Cade, supra note 8, at 1804, 1810.
329 Id. at 1815.
330 See Howell, supra note 139, at 291-92.
331 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15(1), (3) (2019); One Day to Protect New Yorkers, FORTUNE
Soc'y, https://fortunesociety.org/one-day-to-protect-ny/ [https://perma.cc/3DXG-6NZT].
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[thresholds],... render individuals ineligible for certain forms of
relief from removal, or even subject them to mandatory detention."332
Criminal immigrant specialists heralded the change for shielding
"thousands of [immigrant] New Yorkers" from "extraordinarily harsh
and disproportionate [immigration] consequences" arising from such
convictions.333 The legislation applies retroactively and makes it
easier to vacate misdemeanor convictions.334 But, these protections
for noncitizens are outward facing. These do not affect how
noncitizens interact with local law enforcement or how they are
treated in court.
3. The Case for Decriminalization
None of these measures address the specific heightened risk of
removal after being accused of a crime. Further, each tempers the
crimmigration system at points of its perceived excesses. The policies
prevent individuals in some law enforcement agencies from directly
cooperating with their DHS counterparts, and remove explicit areas
of overlap between federal and state law for low-level crimes. When
noncitizens are accused of violent conduct, these protections end.
Reforms aimed at enhancing the capacity of defense attorneys to
ensure the accused knows of the negative immigration consequences
of a particular plea bargain, without addressing the balance of power
in plea negotiations or the uncertainty of changes in federal
enforcement priorities. Each of these measures is ultimately modest:
none disturb the deep entanglement between state criminal and
federal civil law enforcement agencies. These protections preserve
the hallmark of the crimmigration system-the expulsion of
noncitizens for their criminal history, but peels away an exceptional
category of immigrants, for whom removal would be
disproportionate.335 This group may be a large demographic, but it is
presented as morally exceptional and deserving of reprieve. Further,
the core activities of local law enforcement are largely left untouched.
Decriminalization, whether by executive or legislative action,
addresses ome of these shortcomings. It addresses the new harm
332 IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, "ONE DAY TO PROTECT NEW YORKERS", supra note 312, at 1
(citations omitted); see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii), 1229(b)(1)(C) (2012)
(2012).
333 See IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, LEGAL ALERT: ONE DAY TO PROTECT NEW YORKERS ACT
PASSES IN NY STATE (2019), https://fortunesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/One-Day-
bill-bullets-4.2.19.pdf [https://perma.ccUZX2-VGF3].
334 Id.
3,5 See Press Release, Brooklyn Dist. Attorney, Non-Citizen Defendants, supra note 265.
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posed by the 2017 EO because it stems the risk at the charging stage.
Decriminalization tries to disrupt the crimmigration phenomenon at
its root. Unlike the patchwork of information silos, it offers
uniformity: everyone accused of low-level offenses benefits-citizens
and noncitizens alike-including undocumented immigrants.
336
Decriminalization through nullification also accelerates the process
of dismissal for the many cases that prosecutors dismiss when they
offer ACDs.
337
Nullification of broken windows offenses is a partial and temporary
measure for decriminalization. Nullification is not as protective, for
example, as comprehensive decriminalization achieved, for example,
by repealing criminal statutes.338 A prosecutor's decision not to
prosecute a category of offenses does not necessarily mean that police
officers will not arrest those individuals, at least in the short term,
until the police realizes its time is best spent elsewhere. My
experience in criminal court suggests that prosecutors' inaction can
yield changes in police enforcement, but this is not inevitable. A
police officer could arrest someone, knowing all the while that the
arrest will not amount to a charge or issue a civil summons which
does not trigger biometric sharing. Until those arrests cease,
however, noncitizens will be fingerprinted, permitting DHS and ICE
to identify them.339 The local arrest, thus, still permits federal
detection. We do not know how frequently DHS relies on this initial
biometric inquiry to determine whom to apprehend. If police
fingerprinting exposes noncitizens to a higher risk of detection than
a criminal charge, nullification may be less effective.
Despite the imperfections of the nullification strategy,
decriminalization in its various forms expresses a broader view of
what it means to offer sanctuary to noncitizens. Expanded sanctuary
city protections, such as decriminalization, try to improve the quality
of life for immigrants across their various spheres of life. This
intersectional approach centers the lived experiences of those
without the privileges of U.S. citizenship. It is not only the force of
the black letter immigration law that determines whether someone
remains in a new country, but her conditions of employment,
interactions with law enforcement, her access to affordable and safe
housing and quality health care. Non-citizen interactions with police
and the criminal legal system can create grounds for removal, but
336 See CAHN, supra note 276, at 1; Fairfax, supra note 21, at 1272-73, 1274-75.
37 See Fairfax, supra note 21, at 1273-74; KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 147.
38 See Cade, supra note 8, at 1815-17.
339 See id. at 1800.
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harassment by law enforcement also makes life difficult to bear.340
As K-Sue Park documents, nativist forces in state and federal
government have long understood that voluntary departures,
compelled by hostile living conditions for immigrants, can achieve the
same result as legally enforced removals.341 Thus, if one strategy
deployed by such groups is to undermine noncitizens' ability to
remain by orchestrating a climate that leaves noncitizens in a
precarious position, it is incumbent on sanctuary cities, in response,
to enact policies that allow noncitizens not merely to remain legally,
but also to thrive.
While these broader, intersectional concerns animated the
#NYCdontprosecute campaign and Expanded Sanctuary City
platforms, both speak explicitly only about decriminalizing low-level
offenses. They do not specify a limiting principle. They do not
address whether they endorse deportation for some category of
offenses and for some persons. Mijente's platform suggests that it
does not, when it calls for "dismantl[ing] the current policing
apparatus that acts as a funnel to mass incarceration and the
deportation machine."3 42  By contrast, current New York City
sanctuary protections shield noncitizens from the disproportionate
consequences of a criminal conviction. Liberal policy think tanks
similarly focus on the harshness of being deported for minor offenses.
That proportionality test is relatively easy to apply for such offenses,
which is precisely where the campaign drew the line. Where and if
one draws the line for decriminalization reflects a deeper political
cleavage between liberal and abolitionist agenda for law reform.
343
Following a liberal law reform agenda, decriminalization is most
appropriate for low-level offenses. If criminal law is intended to
adjudicate morally culpable conduct, broken windows offenses have
no justifiable place-they neither consistently produce outcomes that
340 See, e.g., LAURIE BERG, MIGRANT RIGHTS AT WORK: LAW'S PRECARIOUSNESS AT THE
INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION AND LABOUR, at xiv, xvi (2016).
341 See K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARv. L. REV. 1878, 1917 (2019).
342 UNZUETA, supra note 17, at 1; RITCHIE & MORRIS, supra note 17, at 3.
'13 See Rodriguez, supra note 29. Rodriguez compares the Brennan Center for Justice's
approach to addressing the growth in the American prison population with We Charge
Genocide's organizing in Chicago against police violence led by directly impacted youth to draw
out the differences between liberal and abolitionist analyses and agenda. Rodriguez writes,
"[t]he reformist promise animating the Brennan Center's work pivots on the liberal belief that
racist state violence is not a fundamental and systemic (or otherwise-intended) production of
the U.S. racial/racist state." Id. at 1595-96. By contrast, We Charge Genocide does not frame
police violence as an "episodic" instance of police brutality that lives outside of the law. Rather
it views police violence as "systemic, institutionalized, [and] juridically condoned," which thus
require solutions that live outside of the law as it is written. Id. at 1603.
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reflect legal guilt nor moral culpability.344 Their dominance in
criminal court reflects a legal regime that elevates rule compliance
over moral innocence. Decriminalization of low-level offenses
removes a category of offense that has distorted the institution's
purported purpose.345 Similarly, if criminal convictions help to
distinguish "good" from "bad" immigrants, quality-of-life offenses are
a poor filter because these charges reflect the outcomes of local
population management strategy rather than a reliable and
legitimate finding of individual wrongdoing. Low-level offenses are
poor fuel for an immigration policy purportedly motivated by national
security concerns. The crimmigration system's reliance on these
offenses suggests that it has failed on its own terms.
Decriminalization of low-level offenses realigns the criminal and
immigration systems with myths perpetuated about their core
purposes. Such a measure would not only alter the scope of the
current administration's enforcement priorities, but also that of its
predecessor. Pursuant to President Obama's "families, not felons"
policy, individuals convicted of low-level offenses were also
deported.346 A liberal challenge to the "families, not felons" policy
would turn on bringing to light the types of crimes triggering
removal. This exposition would demonstrate that individuals who
commit these offenses are not actually all felons, whether under state
law or in popular understanding. Thus, this kind of reform would
preserve the goals of the policy but would demand an overhaul of who
counts as a "felon," and who is a deserving family member. Expulsion
would remain a legitimate expression of state authority, but would
be reserved and rationalized for individuals accused of a residual
category of serious crimes.
In contrast, whereas for abolitionist organizing it may be
strategically savvy to launch a decriminalization campaign
beginning with low-level offenses; it is not the place to end. It is easy
to decry broken window offenses. These offenses elevate the quality
of the lives of White, middle class New Yorkers at the expense of the
city's poor, Black, and Latinx residents. It becomes clear whom the
law serves and who are objects of its regulation. As Alexandra
344 See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1527, 1535 (1992); Fairfax,
supra note 21, at 1252, 1254, 1274-75.
345 See KoHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 141, at 2; Fairfax, supra note 21, at 1252, 1254;
Natapoff, supra note 22, at 81 ("IT]he notion that the criminal process articulates shared moral
concepts and reinforces social solidarity depends on the idea that criminal prosecutions and
convictions represent moral judgments about defendant behavior.").
36 See 2014 Obama Immigration National Address, supra note 23.
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Natapoff articulates, using the metaphor of a penal pyramid, at the
lowest and largest slice of the pyramid, "legal theory has less
explanatory power ... [n]otions of social control and institutional
power... offer more persuasive explanation for case outcomes.
'347
At that lowest level, the application of the law is most clearly
motivated by race, gender, and class. With increased severity in
charge, the moral force of the law is at its apex. "At the top, fidelity
to legal principle holds out the promise of a certain kind of
fairness."348 The abolitionist challenge is to pivot seamlessly from
critically scrutinizing how criminal law is applied at the lower tiers
of the pyramid to its upper echelons. Thus, while the explanatory
force of sociological units of race and class may be more obvious for
broken window offenses, the law at the top of the pyramid does not
operate neutrally. The law may instead be better at concealing its
social agenda, and there may be conflicting forces animating legal
processes. "[D]epending on the severity of the offenses and their
corresponding spot on the pyramid, different socio-legal descriptions
gain or lose purchase."349 But while the descriptions may vary, the
inherently social force of penal law persists at all levels of its
enactment.
On this count, the campaign's vision was incomplete. Organizers
did not highlight the continuities between broken windows offenses
and violent crime. And yet, while the campaign did not portray
broken windows offenses as an exceptionally troubling feature of the
criminal legal system, it was silent about sanctuary protections
higher up the penal pyramid.
Ultimately, across the tiers of the penal pyramid, the social
question that criminal law tries to answer is, what keeps us safe?
The carceral fix for guaranteeing collective safety is the criminal
record, jail, prison, detention center and deportation.3 5° These tools
negate the reality of rehabilitation and erase the hope for
redemption.351  Instead of deportations and prison sentences,
37 Natapoff, supra note 22, at 88.
348 Id. at 89.
349 Id. at 82.
350 See Liz Samuels & David Stein, Perspectives on Critical Resistance, in ABOLITION Now!




351 See RaeDeen Keahiolalo-Karasuda, Carceral Landscape in Hawaii: The Politics of
Empire, the Commodification of Bodies, and a Way Home, in ABOLITION Now! TEN YEARS OF




abolitionist oriented organizing places trust in systems of
accountability that acknowledge harm when it has actually occurred,
but offers the chance at repair through dialogue.
352
Just as community organizing in New York City helped to debunk
the morality and empirical postulates behind broken windows
policing, we know have a similar opportunity to question how
immigration enforcement addresses both low-level and serious
offenses. That process begins with critically examining the reliance
on deportations and detention as the tools for collective security and
developing notions of safety that are distinct from state narratives of
national security. Stressing the harms of expulsion and to whom it
befalls, can also help to dispel the myths of the rational neutrality of
the law, even at the top of the pyramid.
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NULLIFICATION
Having considered the benefits of decriminalization, I now assess
the merits of nullification. From where does such a move draw its
legitimacy? What is its limiting principle? Nullification is justified
here because it enacts a more inclusive vision for public safety that
is responsive to the local realities lived by communities most affected
by criminalization.
53
Prosecutorial nullification sits at the outer bound of a prosecutor's
discretion, but it implicates the same concerns as any exercise of
discretion. As a general matter, under both federal354 and New York
Years-of-Strategy-and-Struggle-against-the-Prison-Industrial-Complex.pdf [https://perma.cc
/QKT4-XGBF].
352 See Beth E Richie, Foreword, 37 SOC. JUST., no. 4, 2011/2012, at 12, 12-13, https://
communityaccountability.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/foreword-bethrichie.pdf [https://perma
.cc/H3GL-3NF7].
353 See Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of "The People" in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 249, 297 (2019).
354 Although Yick Wo v. Hopkins established in theory that racially selective enforcement
violates equal protection of the laws, no claim has satisfied its threshold in the century since.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court invalidated
a statute, which was facially racially neutral, but was administered by public authority in such
a way as to manifest discriminatory intent. Id. at 374. The case established the rule that the
decision to prosecute cannot be based on arbitrary classification, such as race. See id. In the
years since Yick Wo, the viability of such a claim has been further narrowed. To make such a
claim of selective prosecution, there must be both discriminatory effect and purpose by showing
others similarly situated were not subject to the same criminal penalties. See United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
Such a showing must precede discovery, which is virtually impossible to establish. Claims of
selective prosecution are inherently difficult to document because records of what charges
prosecutors do not bring may not exist. Furthermore, there is a presumption in favor of the
government. In the federal context, the Supreme Court grants the executive "broad discretion"
and "latitude" as part of the delegated authority of the President. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464
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State law, a prosecutor's discretion is not subject to judicial review.355
Because the law affords prosecutors virtually unchecked discretion,
soft values offer more guidance than black letter law. The core values
grounding scholarly discussion of prosecutorial discretion include:
independence, separation of powers, lack of bias, consistency, and
accountability.35 6 These core values of liberal government are often
in tension with one another.357 Scholars have also proposed various
mechanisms for arriving at the right balance between these values:
self-regulation,358 judicial commissions,359 legislative guidelines,
360
and repealing immunity.361 One point of pressure for regulating
(quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607). "As a result, 'the presumption of regularity supports' their
prosecutorial decisions and, 'in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume
that they have properly discharged their ... duties."' Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting
United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)). Imbler v. Pachtman has
insulated state prosecutors from civil liability and declared a broad doctrine of prosecutorial
immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430-31 (1976).
355 N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 700 (McKinney 2019) ("Except as provided in section seven hundred
one of this chapter, it shall be the duty of every district attorney to conduct all prosecutions for
crimes and offenses cognizable by the courts of the county for which he or she shall have been
elected or appointed; except when the place of trial of an indictment is changed from one county
to another, it shall be the duty of the district attorney of the county where the indictment is
found to conduct the trial of the indictment so removed, and it shall be the duty of the district
attorney of the county to which such trial is changed to assist in such trial upon the request of
the district attorney of the county where the indictment was found. He or she shall perform
such additional and related duties as may be prescribed by law and directed by the board of
supervisors."); In re Coleman, 148 N.Y.S.2d 753, 757 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (citing People v.
Fielding, 53 N.E. 497, 498 (N.Y. 1899)); McDonald v. Goldstein, 83 N.Y.S.2d 620, 622 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1948)) ("It might be well to observe that the District Attorney is a quasi-judicial officer, and
as such has wide discretion in the manner in which his duties shall be performed."); 1965 N.Y.
Op. Att'y Gen. 118 ("From a study of the above cases it would appear that the courts have
recognized the discretion of a district attorney in any given case as to whether or not he will
prosecute [minor crimes and misdemeanors].").
356 See W. RANDOLPH TESLIK, NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE 1, 5 (1975); Daniel Epps, Adversarial
Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 771 (2016); Bruce A- Green & Fred
C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 843, 851, 852, 853-54; Rebecca
Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6
SETON HALL CiR. REV. 1, 3 (2009).
357 See TESLIK, supra note 356, at 5; Green & Zacharias, supra note 356, at 893.
358 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 356, at 840 ("[P]rosecutors should make decisions
based on articulable principles or subprinciples that command broad societal acceptance. This
insight poses a challenge, for prosecutors have never, either individually or collectively,
undertaken the task of identifying workable norms for the array of discretionary decisions that
their offices make each day."); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 125, 196 (2008).
359 See Bennett L. Gershman, New Commission to Regulate Prosecutorial Misconduct,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2014, 12:09 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.combennett-l-
gershman/new-commission-to-prosecutorial-misconduct b_5353570.html [https://perma.cc
[MP7A-Z8BG].
36 See PFAFF, supra note 216, at 206-07.
361 See Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Dangerous Power of the Prosecutor, 29 PACE L. REV.
1, 21-22 (2008); Evan Bernick, It's Time to End Prosecutorial Immunity, HUFFINGTON POST
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discretion remains under-appreciated: public participation, of which
the case study offers one illustration.
36 2
Before parsing through the soft values behind discretion, it is
helpful to be specific about the kind of discretion at issue. Whether
in an individual case or an entire category of cases, a prosecutor's
office enjoys the greatest flexibility with low-level offenses.363 Low-
level offenses lack "normative guilt"; thus, prosecutors enjoy greater
public legitimacy when exercising their discretion.364 For serious
offenses, prosecutors are traditionally more constrained by public
outcry.365 Public pressure can limit their discretion at the higher
end.366 The campaign's focus on low-level offenses exploit this
dichotomy.
Prosecutors, even when in possession of sufficient proof, are not
commanded to prosecute every single infraction of law contemplated
by the legislature.36 7  Their independence from the legislature
preserves the separation of powers. For example, "[c]ourts have
consistently ... ruled in categorical terms that writs of mandamus
can never be issued to compel prosecution.'" 368 Resource constraints
alone would prevent mandatory enforcement. More importantly, the
traditional view of the prosecutor entrusts the position with the
executive expertise to determine which charges should be filed and
which ones should not, even when there is probable cause.
369
Considerations against pressing charges could include protecting
witnesses or delaying prosecution until after the completion of a long-
term investigation.370 These kinds of reasons for not prosecuting
reflect concerns about law enforcement and fall squarely in the realm
of ordinary discretion. Nullification, by contrast, is when a
prosecutor decides not to prosecute because she disagrees with "the
wisdom of the law or of the desirability of punishing a culpable
wrongdoer."371 Such decisions about the desirability of a law are
(Aug. 12, 2015, 5:47 PM) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-bernick/its-time-to-end-
prosecuto b 7979276.html [https://perma.cc/2UCV-X6SD].
362 See, e.g., 5 Boro Defs., Call for Moratorium, supra note 5.
363 See Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1531.
364 See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657-58 (2010); Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1531.
365 See Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1526.
366 See id. at 1526-27.
367 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 356, at 874-75.
36' Sarat & Clarke, supra note 7, at 401-02.
369 See Preliminary Proceedings, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 273, 273-76 (2018).
370 See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1977); Sarat & Clarke, supra note 7,
at 391.
371 Fairfax, supra note 21, at 1262.
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conventionally associated with legislative action. Under the current
institutional framework, however, nullification is not "ultra vires,"
but part of the parcel of expansive prosecutorial discretion.372 The
wisdom and advisability of nullification is a separate matter.
There are several reasons why nullification can be appropriate.
While the #NYCdontprosecute campaign asked the DAs to reconsider
punishing individuals for minor offenses, the request was made in a
context of aggressive enforcement.373 The statutes enforced by the
DAs' offices existed long before 1994 when the NYPD initiated its new
policing strategy.374  The broken windows strategy was not
characterized by the creation of new criminal statutes, but by the
unrelenting enforcement of existing statutes in certain
communities.375 While legislative repeal would be equally effective
in ending broken windows policing and prosecution, such statutory
change takes a long time to achieve. Statutory change alone misses
an important moment for accountability. Local law enforcement,
specifically, the NYPD and City DAs deployed state criminal statutes
to apply its policing strategy. Nullification thus performs an
important service of acknowledging the damaging role law
enforcement played.
Nullification also provides an opportunity to test future plans for
legislative decriminalization.376  Executive officers, such as
prosecutors, are nimble and flexible in their ability to make
significant policy changes.377 A policy of prosecutorial nullification is
only as permanent as the elected official wants it to be. Prosecutorial
nullification serves as a stepping stone towards permanent
legislative change.378 Its impermanence from administration to
372 See id. at 1267.
373 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1744
(2005); 5 Boro Defs., Call for Moratorium, supra note 5.
374 See MODELS FOR INNOVATION, supra note 135, at 20; Jeremy Kaplan-Lyman, Note, A
Punitive Bind: Policing, Poverty, and Neoliberalism in New York City, 15 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 177, 204-05 (2012); e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.05, 155.25, 221.05 (McKinney 2019).
375 See Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 66 (2017).
376 See, e.g., Deanna Paul, Legalizing Marijuana Is Now One of Cuomo's Priorities. He's Been
Resisting It for Years, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation
/2018/12/17/legalizing-marijuana-is-now-one-cuomos-priorities-hes-been-resistingityears/
[https://perma.cc/AKR6-NCC4].
377 See Fairfax, supra note 21, at 1274.
378 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1057
(2015); cf. David Thatcher, Don't End Broken Windows Policing, Fix It: Quality of Life is Not
Just for Wealthy Suburbanites, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.themarshall
project.org/2015/09/09/don-t-end-broken-windows-policing-fix-it [https://perma.cc/4SFH-
JQ4W] (arguing that modern policing should focus on the proper implementation of public order
rules instead of abandoning them altogether).
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administration, or from political moment to moment, permits
experimentation. City policies have often been the laboratory for
statewide policies in New York. 379 For example, partial marijuana
decriminalization in Brooklyn under DA Kenneth Thompson and his
successor, DA Eric Gonzalez, set the stage for Governor Cuomo's
announced plan for legalization statewide.
S0
Nullification also expresses a different separation of powers-the
local versus state government divide.38 1  "The history of the
development of the office of prosecutor has the clear theme ... of
'local representation applying local standards to the enforcement of
essentially local laws."'38 2  Nullification gives expression to local
concerns about the application of statewide criminal statutes.38 3 The
zero-tolerance approach to policing is unique to urban environments
like New York City, where there is a high concentration of
noncitizens who are middle or lower class, and non-White, who face
aggressive policing and severe consequences, as compared to other
parts of New York State.
384
The second possible concern raised by the #NYCdontprosecute
campaign's demands is that it erodes the independence of the
prosecutor. Independence has several facets. The first concern may
be that the prosecutor is being swayed by a momentary outcry.35 The
theory of broken windows policing has been slowly and
systematically debunked by a range of actors, from within
government and from civil society, over the course of a decade.38 6 The
brief history in Section III.A narrates the sustained struggle by social
movements, and the intergovernmental consensus they achieved: a
ruling by a federal court, legislation in New York City Council,
findings by the Office of the Inspector General for NYPD, and
changes in NYPD enforcement, specifically, its recalibration.
38 7
#NYCdontprosecute relied on and built on these lasting to changes
city government.
379 See Paul, supra note 376.
3so See id.
381 See Robert Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717, 718-19, 731 (1996).
382 Id. at 731.
383 See Fairfax, supra note 21, at 1268; Misner, supra note 381, at 718-19, 731.
394 See Jojo Annobil, The Immigration Representation Project: Meeting the Critical Needs of
Low-Wage and Indigent New Yorkers FacingRemoval, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 517, 520-21(2009).
385 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 356, at 869-70.
386 See Kaplan-Lyman, supra note 374, at 206.
387 See THE CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF "BROKEN WINDOWS" POLICING IN NYC, supra
note 167, at v, vii.
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Another kind of concern about independence arises when a
prosecutor is swayed by the loudest or most powerful voice.388 There
is a reasonable expectation that a DA will not be swayed by arbitrary
factors-like who has access, who enjoys favor, or shares partisan
affiliations.38 9  Awarding preferential treatment to defendants
because of their access to the prosecutor creates inconsistent
outcomes that cannot be justified.390 But this concern is also easily
dispelled here. First, nullification does not create the risk of
disparate outcomes. It has the benefit of being uniform. The
campaign asked for equal treatment-namely that no one be charged
with a quality of life offense.391
Second and more significantly, concerns about independence
assume two facts: there are channels for meaningful public
engagement with DA offices, and that prosecutors adequately
consider a diverse range of perspectives when they apply the law.
Neither of these are true.
DA offices have been historically insulated from public scrutiny.
Prosecutors' immunity from accountability is well-documented.
392
Prosecutorial discretion is also unreviewable in court.393  Most
elections are uncontested, heavily favor incumbents, and are rarely
the site for substantive discussion about law, policy, or justice.
394
Although, in the last year, some prosecutors across the country have
opened their doors to community input,3 95 these steps remain
informal, and do not approximate systematic public oversight. In
New York State, prosecutors have in fact challenged judicial
oversight over their offices. The New York State District Attorney's
388 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 356, at 861-62, 869-70.
389 See id. at 852-53 (stating that a prosecutor must act in a nonbiased fashion and avoid
decisions based on impermissible criteria).
390 See, e.g., Al Baker, Arrest of a Bronx Prosecutor Is Said to Uncover Possible Favored
Treatment in Past, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2011, at A23.
391 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
392 See, e.g., Randall Grometstein & Jennifer M. Balboni, Backing Out of a Constitutional
Ditch: Constitutional Remedies for Gross Prosecutorial Misconduct Post Thompson, 75 ALB. L.
REV. 1243, 1268, 1270-71 (2011).
393 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 361, at 19.
394 See Misner, supra note 381, at 774-75; Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections,
67 SMU L. REV. 593, 600 (2014).
395 See, e.g., Brandon Bossert, Attorney General Takes in Public Input During Criminal
Justice Town Hall, WMDT (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.wmdt.com/2019/02/attorney-general-
takes-in-public-input-during-criminal-justice-town-hall [https://perma.cc/8WV8-C64J].
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Association recently sued after the state legislature created a judicial
commission designed to detect and prevent wrongful convictions.
396
As Jocelyn Simonson has explained, although the prosecutor is
formally the representative of the people in court, in practice she is
largely selective of which voices she amplifies in the positions she
takes.397 Namely, the prosecutor takes most of her cues from victims
and the tough on crime public, although this is changing in small
ways.398 While it is impossible for a prosecutor to weigh all demands
placed on her office equally,399 there must at least be channels for a
diverse range of constituents to communicate their concerns. The
experiences and desires of individuals who are directly impacted and
their families are, however, typically ignored.400 The defense, at best,
can only represent the perspective of the individual accused.401 Even
to the extent the interests of the accused person's community are
conveyed in plea negotiations or in court, the defense is the weakest
actor in court, at least in New York City.40 2  Prosecutorial
independence is hard to achieve if only some voices are heard.
The campaign proposes a model for engagement to address this
deficit in public participation from directly impacted communities.
40 3
For noncitizens who cannot vote, picking up the phone may be one of
the few avenues for engagement. The script for the campaign, and
the telephone calls were disruptive.40 4 In the absence of other
channels for input and oversight, disruption may be the only choice,
particularly where the concerns about prosecutorial behavior are
time sensitive and implicate potentially irreversible consequences.
Disruption not only grants access to groups excluded from
prosecutors' decision-making calculus, but it also rebalances the
adversarial system. Public defenders asked for external support
because of their weakness relative to their adversaries in shaping
outcomes in their clients' favor.
A final independence concern is that the campaign subjects
technical and administrative matters to the meddling of an inexpert
396 See Carl Campanile, Lawyers Sue Cuomo over Law That Probes Prosecutor Misconduct,
N.Y. POST (Oct. 17, 2018, 8:57 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/10/17/lawyers-sue-cuomo-over-
law-that-probes-prosecutor-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/W3WK-CRY].
397 See Simonson, supra note 353, at 270-71.
398 See id. at 278, 286-87.
39 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 356, at 867.
400 See Simonson, supra note 353, at 265-66.
401 See id. at 285; Robin Steinberg & Skylar Albertson, Broken Windows Policing and
Community Courts: An Unholy Alliance, 37 CARDozo L. REV. 995, 998-99 (2016).
402 See Simonson, supra note 353, at 252, 269; Bowers, supra note 364, at 1705-06.
403 See Simonson, supra note 353, at 286.
404 See 5 Boro Defs., Calls for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
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public. First, the campaign relied on the expertise of public defenders
to explain the urgency of the moratorium and the insufficiency of
current strategies to mitigate collateral consequences.40 5 Second,
professional prosecutors rarely deploy their legal expertise to
prosecute these cases.40 6 Broken windows charges are reflexively
leveled because prosecutors need only to rely on police observations
to bring charges.407 These cases are "advantageous, quick-and-dirty
pleas with minimal resource outlay. ' 408  There is also strong
solidarity with the police department. In turn, DA offices rarely
perform their own investigations in these cases. "The data bear out
these assumptions, demonstrating that prosecutors charge petty
public order offenses most frequently."409
The absence of lay scrutiny is arguably what has perpetuated the
scale of broken windows prosecutions. The absence of journalists,
trials-or at the very least, jury trials-and meaningful discovery, for
these offenses mean that many of the facts underlying the charges
rarely see the light of day.410 Many of these cases are resolved at the
accused's first appearance.411 The absence of public scrutiny has been
essential in sustaining the status quo.4 1 2 Community court watch
programs have grown in part to force transparency on criminal
courts.
4 1 3
The demand for nullification made by the campaign ultimately
drew its legitimacy from public participation, in several reinforcing
ways. The campaign relied on members of the public to call their DA
office.414 A broad coalition of civil society organizations supported the
action.41 5 Finally, the campaign built on an emerging understanding
about the harms of the broken windows policing.416 The campaign
models a mechanism for regulating prosecutorial discretion that is
substantially different from other proposals: disruptive public
405 See id. at 269.
406 See Bowers, supra note 364, at 1703-04.
407 See id. at 1716, 1718.
408 Id. at 1716.
409 Id.
410 See id. at 1705-06.
411 See id. at 1705.
412 See id. at 1705-06, 1713-14.
413 See Steinberg & Albertson, supra note 401, at 996-97; Beth Schwartzapfel, The
Prosecutors, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 26, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2018/02/26/the-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/42YJ-QNZX].
414 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5.
415 See id.
416 See id.; Immigrant Rights Day of Action, MORE (Feb. 14, 2017), https://morecaucusnyc




participation.417 Such a mechanism for engagement is particularly
well-suited to give voices to groups that are de facto or de jure
disenfranchised-here, noncitizens, who are members of
communities that are policed and poor, are Black or Latinx.
The demand for nullification is perhaps more controversial when
analyzed from the perspective of an abolitionist agenda. Nullification
shrinks the footprint of enforcement without shrinking the
prosecutor's power. The prosecutor retains control over the decision
to nullify, and it is a decision at the outermost bounds of its
unregulated discretion. Therefore, organizers should pursue
nullification in parallel with legislative change and campaigns to
shrink the DAs' budgets in light in their reduced caseload, and
redirect funds to address the underlying social problems broken
windows policing unsuccessfully tried to address: the lack of economic
opportunity, healthcare, housing, and political power.
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors have a powerful tool at their disposal to enact more
robust sanctuary protections and disrupt the crimmigration system
at its root. But nullification is unlikely to take place without
sustained external pressure; without a forceful demand, prosecutors
are unlikely to decline to prosecute. Removing low-level offenses
from the ambit of state criminalization stands to benefit noncitizens,
not only by ensuring better immigration outcomes but also by
improving their overall quality of life. Because decriminalization is
also a policy with benefits for noncitizens and citizens alike, such a
campaign creates the possibility of building a broad coalition that
brings together communities which are over-policed and those which
are at risk for removal. By redefining public safety, social movements
led by directly impacted communities can encourage local elected
officials to experiment with policies like nullification. This kind of
issue-based participation may also plant the seed for sustained public
engagement with prosecutors who have evaded accountability for too
long. To solidify any gains achieved and truly shrink the ambit of
criminalization, a successful campaign will seek a reduction in law
enforcement budgets, redistribution of resources to communities, and
lasting decriminalization at the legislative level.
417 See 5 Boro Defs., Call for a Moratorium, supra note 5 (encouraging the public to call or
tweet at local DAs and ask for a moratorium on broken windows prosecutions).
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